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herlige feriar i ein elles travel masterkvardag. Karoline som midt i sitt eige masterstress laga 
framsida mi. Takk til Hilde Haraldstad og Hallvard Notaker for gode råd på vegen. Takk til 
Kåre Willoch for at du tok deg tid til ein rådvill masterstudent, og til Sverre Dæhlen ved 
Utenriksdepartementets Arkiv for uvurderleg hjelp. Takk til David og Thomas som delte 
arkivmaterialet sitt med meg. And, in English so that you may understand, thank you Victor 
for providing me with invaluable sources from your own archival research.   
Heilt til slutt, men kanskje aller mest, vil eg takke deg, Vegard. For ditt uendelege tålmod, for 
korrekturlesing og retting, for trøyst og oppmuntring, for hemningslaus vekkskjemming når 
eg føler at eg fortener det aller minst, og for at du alltid alltid trur på meg. Du er alt for meg.  
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1.0 Introduction  
Opposition to General Francisco Franco’s authoritarian regime was an enduring feature of 
Norwegian foreign policy. This opposition went so far that the possibility of Spanish 
membership in NATO caused the Norwegian Government to threaten to exercise its veto 
within the Alliance. Evidence suggests that this was the first and, for the time being, the only 
time that Norway has made this threat during its time as a NATO member.
1
 For decades 
Norway maintained a policy of demonstrative distancing and fought Spanish NATO 
membership with all its might.
2
 How did this policy change from the death of the Spanish 
dictator and up until Spain eventually did join NATO in 1982? The main purpose of this 
thesis is to answer this question.    
The Spanish question is an inherently interesting piece of Norwegian foreign policy history. 
In refusing to accept Spain as an ally, Norway opposed both the major powers and the 
majority within the country’s most important alliance. And, importantly, Norway succeeded 
in preventing Spanish membership for decades. Being a small state, Norway had – and still 
has – relatively limited influence on the wider international developments. Even within 
NATO Norway can only expect to influence the decision-making processes to a certain 
degree.
3
 Studies focusing on small states in international relations tell us that small states 
enhance their political influence through engagement in international organisations and trough 
the creation of global regimes, laws and norms.
4
 In doing so Norway has been successful, and 
has indeed built an international reputation that surpasses its small population, size and 
military capacity. Through peacekeeping and norm entrepreneurship Norway has, according 
to Christine Ingebrigtsen, created its own niche in world politics.
5
 But the fact remains that, 
although international organisations often create advantages for small states, they do not exist 
outside the realities of international politics. The basic principles of power apply also within 
such organisations, a fact that translates into powerful states being more able than small states 
to set the agenda, weight their votes, promote their policy choices, and ignore the organisation 
                                                 
1
 Hilde Haraldstad, ”Franco-Spanias fiende nummer 1? : Norges politikk overfor Franco-Spania, 1946-1960” 
(Masters’ thesis, Universitetet i Oslo, 1994), 53-55. 
2
 Knut Einar Eriksen and Helge Øystein Pharo, Norsk utenrikspolitisk historie bind 5: Kald krig og 
internasjonalisering 1949-1965. (Oslo: Universitetesforlaget, 1997), 47.  
3
 Knut Einar Eriksen and Helge Øystein Pharo, Norsk utenrikspolitisk historie bind 5: Kald krig og 
internasjonalisering 1949-1965 (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1997), 40. 
4
 Jeanne K Hey, ”Refining Our Understanding of Small State Foreign Policy”, in Small States in World Politics: 
Explaining Foreign Policy Behaviour, ed. Jeanne K. Hey, (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 187. 
5
 Christine Ingebrigtsen, Scandinavia in World Politics (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2006), 57, 
71. 
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when it acts against their preferences.
6
 As a consequence of this, small states are traditionally 
depicted to avoid policies and political behaviour that may threaten to alienate the more 
powerful states in the system.
7
 But this was not the case with Norway and the Spanish 
question. The US, the only superpower within the Alliance, greatly favoured Spanish 
membership. As long as the threat of Norwegian veto remained, however, Spain would be 
excluded.    
1.1 Research question 
From the fact that Spain did join the Alliance in 1982, it is clear that the Norwegian stance at 
some point had to have changed.  It may also be clear that the death of the authoritarian leader 
was important, as it is readily assumed in previous research.
8
 What is less clear, however, is 
the answer to how much this fact changed the Norwegian position. For decades Norway had 
stood between Spain and NATO. Did this long lasting, deep felt opposition die with Franco? 
This is an assumption I question, for the simple reason that Spain did not join NATO in 1975. 
Seven years passed between the death of Franco and the Spanish accession to NATO. The 
main research question will therefore be:  
When, how and why did the Norwegian stance on Spanish membership in NATO change?  
In order to answer the main question, a set of sub-questions are addressed: were there 
concerns about the level of democracy in the new regime? Was there consensus across party 
lines? Did the Government and the Parliament face internal and/or external pressure? How did 
the international context change, and how did this influence the Norwegian stance?  
To be able to answer these question, and due to the lack of previous research on the subject, 
thorough empirical research is needed. Because NATO is an international organisation, and a 
vital part of the integration of Europe, the Norwegian policy had implications beyond 
Norway’s own borders. As Norway became a gatekeeper for Spanish accession to NATO, it 
by extension became a gatekeeper for Spanish EC membership.
9
 In order to investigate how 
                                                 
6
 Jeanne K. Hey, ”Refining Our Understanding of Small State Foreign Policy”, in Small States in World Politics: 
Explaining Foreign Policy Behaviour, ed. Jeanne K. Hey, (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 188. 
7
 Maurice East, ”Size and Foreign Policy Behavoir: A Test of Two Models”. World Politics 25, no 4 (1973): 
557.  
8
 Olav Riste, Norwegian Foreign Policy: A History (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2001), 191; Knut Einar Eriksen 
and Helge Øystein Pharo, Norsk utenrikspolitisk historie bind 5: Kald krig og internasjonalisering 1949-1965 
(Oslo: Universitetesforlaget, 1997), 49; Mark Smith, NATO Enlargement During the Cold War: Strategy and 
System in the Western Alliance (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 138. 
9
 Otto Holman, Integrating Southern Europe: EC Expansion and the Transationalization of Spain (London: 
Routledge, 1996). 
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Norway could assume this role, the theoretical framework of rhetorical action by Frank 
Schimmelfennig is applied to the empirical data.     
1.2 Previous research  
The literature covering relations between Norway and Spain is not vast, and certainly not 
when it comes to the question of Spanish NATO membership. What characterises the 
literature that does exist is a broad agreement both on the reasoning behind the Norwegian 
policy and the effects of it, clearly highlighting the need for further research of the subject.         
The better part of the literature concerning the Spanish question is found in books on 
Norwegian foreign policy and books on Norway’s role within NATO. These studies do not go 
deeply into the subject, and they only discuss the years leading up to 1975. Generally, the 
perspective is the same, with a line of recurring arguments. First of all, Norway’s role as an 
advocate for the democratic profile of NATO is highlighted. It was of fundamental 
importance for Norway that the Alliance should consist of democratic states. Secondly, it is 
argued that the international context played a certain part, but that the main reason for 
Norway’s stand on the question was domestic politics. In addition to widespread ideological 
opposition to the Spanish regime, Spanish membership would have created a huge debate 
about Norway’s participation in the Alliance. Hence, the question did not only concern 
Spanish, but also potentially Norwegian membership. Last, but not least, they all argue that 
Norway was the main reason why Spain was kept outside the Alliance up until 1975.
10
    
There are, however, two exceptions to the generalisations above: one study that deals with the 
subject in depth and another with a different focus. The first of them, and perhaps the research 
most relevant for this thesis, is Franco-Spanias fiende nummer en? Norges politikk overfor 
Franco-Spania, 1946-1960, written by Hilde Haraldstad. It thoroughly analyses Norway’s 
relations with Spain from 1946 to 1960, both bilaterally and in international organisations. 
Her main arguments on Norway and Spanish NATO membership, although generally in 
agreement, are more emphatic than the arguments mentioned in the previous section. Her 
conclusion is that Norway distinguished itself amongst the Western countries as “Spain’s 
Number One Enemy”. Furthermore, Haraldstad claims that this consistent, pronounced and 
                                                 
10
 Frode Liland and Helge Ø. Pharo, “Norge og stride nom NATOs geografiske virkeområde”. In NATO 50 år- 
Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk med NATO gjennom 50 år, eds. Chris Prebensen and Nils Skarland, (Oslo: Den norske 
Atlanterhavskomité, 1999), 183-184; Rolf Tamnes and Knut Einar Eriksen, “Norge og NATO under den kalde 
krigen”. In NATO 50 år- Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk med NATO gjennom 50 år, eds. Chris Prebensen and Nils 
Skarland, (Oslo: Den norske Atlanterhavskomité, 1999) 7-38; Knut Einar Eriksen and Helge Øystein Pharo, 
Norsk utenrikspolitisk historie Bind 5: Kald krig og internasjonalisering 1949-1965, (Oslo: 
Universitetesforlaget, 1997), 48-49. 
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long term resistance against Spanish membership in NATO did not find its counterpart in any 
other Western country, and that the Norwegian policy had decisive influence on the fact that 
Spanish membership was not even officially discussed at NATO meetings.
11
 The second 
exception is Tusen Dager: Norge og den spanske borgerkrigen 1936-1939, by Jo Stein Moen 
and Rolf Sæther. The main focus of this book is Norway’s role in the Spanish Civil War and 
how the conflict in turn influenced the Norwegian society. Regarding Norway and the 
Spanish accession to NATO the arguments are, once again, in line with the other sources. The 
perspective, however, is different. Like the rest of the book, the discussion of the issue is 
marked by a strong focus on the thoughts and actions of the Norwegian Labour Movement.
12
     
It is at this point clear that previous research on the subject is sorely lacking in perspectives 
and chronological coverage. Furthermore, none of these studies discuss the years after 1975. 
Several of them highlight the fact that at the time of Franco’s death in 1975 Spain was still not 
a member of the alliance, but not one of them goes past this point.  
1.3 Justification of the study 
This thesis is justified on three grounds. Firstly, the lack of empirical research alone points to 
the need of further investigation of the topic. There are no studies based on primary sources, 
or attempts at explaining how the policy changed and why. Since 1949 NATO has been the 
cornerstone of Norwegian security and defence policy, and a close relationship with the US 
has always been regarded as vital for the territorial defence of Norway.
13
 The fact that the 
question of Spanish membership is the only time the threat of veto has been exercised, says 
something about the relevance of this question for Norwegian policy. This thesis therefore has 
value to add to our understanding of Norwegian foreign policy. 
Secondly, this case is one of the few times where Norway has been attributed decisive 
influence on questions regarding international relations. This thesis can therefore contribute to 
the understanding of the influence of small states within international organisations. Indeed, 
as Spanish membership in NATO has been dubbed the decisive factor for EC membership
14
, 
                                                 
11
 Hilde Haraldstad, ”Franco-Spanias fiende nummer 1? : Norges politikk overfor Franco-Spania, 1946-1960” 
(Masters’ thesis, Universitetet i Oslo, 1994), 135-141. 
12
 Jo Stein Moen and Rolf Sæther, Tusen dager: Norge og den spanske borgerkrigen 1936-1939 (Finland: 
Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 2009), 300-302. 
13
 Nina Græger, “Norway between Europe and the US”, in New security issues in Northern Europe: the Nordic 
and Baltic states and the ESDP, ed. Clive Archer (London: Routledge, 2008), 111. 
14
 Sebastian Balfour and Paul Preston, “Introduction: Spain and the Great Powers”. In Spain and the Great 
Powers in the Twentieth Century, eds. Sebastian Balfour and Paul Preston, (London: Routlegde, 1999), 10.  
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one could argue that the Norwegian policy thus had implications for European integration in a 
broader sense. 
Thirdly, this thesis provides a political science perspective to historical research. By applying 
and modifying the theory of rhetorical action the analysis can provide new insights into how 
strategic argumentation influences the decision making process in international organisations.   
1.4 Approach and sources 
This thesis offers a qualitative analysis of the Norwegian policy with regards to the question 
of Spanish NATO membership, from the death of General Francisco Franco in 1975 to the 
Spanish accession in 1982.  
The analysis is primarily based on archival sources, of which some have been open to the 
public, some have been classified and yet others have been declassified for the purpose of this 
thesis. Needless to say, the so-called raw primary sources provided by archival research offer 
many advantages. They enable us to address a broad range of questions, uncover brand new 
information and thus expand our empirical understanding of the subject at hand.
15
 As such, 
archival research provides insights perhaps no other approach could provide, something that 
has been of infinite value with regards to the underresearched subject of this thesis.     
Archival research does, however, bring with it certain challenges. It is, according to Masters, 
“not the passive recording of objective data but a reader’s constructive, subjective ordering 
and making meaning out of what he or it chooses to examine”. 16 It is therefore important to 
have a clear understanding of yourself as a researcher. What you choose to ignore and what 
you regard as important is dependent upon who you are and your previous experience.
17
 In 
my case, especially one factor needs to be taken into consideration. I have my background in 
political science, and this thesis is my first encounter with the historical method and archival 
research. A political scientist attempting to do a historian’s job is faced with many challenges, 
something Andrew Moravcsik got to learn the hard way. His book The Choice for Europe: 
Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht was certainly not treated with 
kid gloves when reviewed by historians. Though highly praised by many, his work was 
                                                 
15
 Douglas B Harris, “Recovering History and Discovering Data in the Archives: An Alternative Mode of 
Research for Congress Scholars”, in An American Political Archives Reader, eds. Glenn Gray, Rebecca Johnson 
Melvin and Karen D. Paul (Lanham: Scarecrow Press 2009) 429-430.  
16
 Thomas Masters, “Reading the Archive of Freshman English”, in Working in the Archives – Practical 
Research Methods for Rhetoric and Composition, eds. Alexis E. Ramsey, Wendy B. Sharer, Barbara 
L’eplattenier and Lisa S. Mastrangelo (Illinois: Illinois University Press, 2010) 157. 
17
 Ibid., 158.   
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accused of almost completely disregarding the international context, of seeing too much 
through the eyes of a theorist,
18
 and of suffering from “soft sources and weak evidence”19. 
There are clearly many pitfalls, but as they are acknowledged, they may also be avoided.  
As to avoiding the above mentioned pitfalls, this thesis does consider both the international 
and domestic situation. Due to the limitations in scope of this thesis, the international context 
is not discussed at length, but remains an important consideration. Moving on to the 
theoretical aspect, I do not claim that the theoretical approach chosen for this thesis is able to 
explain the entire process, but argue instead that the logic of rhetorical action – the strategic 
use of arguments to persuade other actors to act according to one’s preferences – may provide 
a deeper insight into the Spanish accession to NATO and the Norwegian policy with regard to 
this question. In this insight lies also the possibility for generalisation, for a deeper 
understanding of how small states without heavy bargaining power are able to influence the 
enlargement processes of international organisations. Modifications to the theory are made, an 
approach some might be uncomfortable with. It is not hard to argue, however, that it is better 
than the often used alternative, which is forcing the facts to fit the theory. Like Robert W. 
Rauchaus
20
, I argue that by being problem-driven – trying to answer the questions at hand – 
rather than theory-driven – only looking at the questions defined by the theoretical approach – 
the strengths and weaknesses of IR theory may become even more apparent. Lastly, the broad 
range of archival sources ensures that the analysis has a strong foundation.  
The archives I have visited for the purpose of this thesis are Utenriksdepartementets Arkiv 
(the Archives of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Riksarkivet (the Norwegian 
National Archives), Stortingsarkivet (the Norwegian Parliamentary Archives) and 
Arbeiderbevegelsens Arkiv og Bibliotek (the archives of the Norwegian Labour Movement). 
Additionally I have been given access to archival sources from the UK and US National 
Archives, procured by project associates.   
 Parliamentary proceedings and secondary literature like books and articles and have been 
used to complement the archival sources. Interviews with people directly involved in the 
process, which might have made another supplement, have been excluded due to time 
                                                 
18
 Pierre-Henri Laurent, review of Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to 
Maastricht, by Andrew Moravscik, The International History Review 21, no 4 (1999): 1096-1098. 
19
 Robert S. Lieshout, Mathieu L.L and Johanna Maria van der Vleuten, review of Choice for Europe: Social 
Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht, by Andrew Moravscik, Journal of Cold War Studies 6, no 
4 (2004): 89-139. 
20
 Robert W. Rauchhaus, “Explaining NATO enlargement”. Contemporary Security Policy 21, no 2 (2007): 191.  
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constraints, but also because written sources are better suited for later verification and because 
they reduce the natural risk of incorrect recollections. Since more than thirty years have 
passed since the Spanish accession to NATO, the risk of incorrect or inadequate recollections 
of the events is substantial.   
1.5 Thesis outline 
The next chapter provides an assessment of the theoretical framework of the thesis, which is 
based on Frank Schimmelfennig’s theory of rhetorical action. It explains the logic of 
rhetorical action and how it can provide insight into the process of NATO enlargement. The 
main argument is that rhetorical action, with a few modifications, seems suitable to explain 
Spain’s accession to NATO and important elements of the Norwegian policy on this issue. 
 Chapter three describes the development of the Norwegian policy towards Spain, from the 
outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936 to the death of the authoritarian leader Francisco 
Franco in 1975. It explores the effects the Civil War had on the Norwegian society and 
considers the Norwegian policy both in bilateral relations with Spain and in international 
cooperation. The chapter argues that the Spanish question inhabited a unique position in 
Norwegian foreign policy throughout this period and that Norway continuously acted as one 
of Franco’s main opponents in international cooperation.   
Chapters four to six analyse the Norwegian policy on Spanish NATO membership from 1975 
until the Spanish accession in 1982. The analysis follows the chain of events chronologically, 
and assesses the events in the context of both the international and domestic situation. Chapter 
four analyses the first years after the death of Franco, and argues that the restrictive 
Norwegian policy was maintained throughout this period. In demanding evidence of Spain 
becoming a fully-fledged democracy, Norway acted as a gatekeeper for NATO. Chapter five 
analyses the Norwegian policy from June 1977 to September 1981. The main argument is that 
though Norway no longer directly opposed Spanish membership, they maintained one of the 
most restrictive policies on the issue. This policy was characterised by objections on form and 
timing, though based on concerns of another nature. Chapter six analyses the Norwegian 
policy from the change in government in October 1981 to the Spanish accession in May 1982 
and claims that the change from a Labour to a Conservative government marked a turning-
point with regard to the question of Spanish NATO membership. This turning-point meant 
that Norway’s role changed from that of brakeman to active proponent of Spanish accession.  
 
8 
 
Chapter seven, which summarises and furthers the analysis, is structured thematically. The 
main argument is that the changes in the Norwegian policy may be boiled down to being a 
result of two important elections and that the logic of rhetorical action provides valuable 
insights into the process of the Spanish accession.               
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2.0 Theoretical approach 
Facts never really speak for themselves. Every historical interpretation therefore needs a 
conceptual core, some kind of theoretical framework to give meaning to the empirical 
evidence that is found. A theory, on the other hand, needs empirical support to clarify its 
meaning and prove theoretical points.
21
 In this way empirical data and theory are able to 
complement and enrich each other.  
This chapter will account for the theoretical approach of the thesis. The purpose is to establish 
a wider framework for the empirical analysis in order to understand the context in which the 
process of Spanish accession to NATO took place. By providing a theoretical explanation for 
the enlargement of international organisations, the Norwegian policy can be seen as part of 
the bigger picture of international relations. The chapter starts with an analysis of the 
relevance of Frank Schimmelfennig’s rhetorical action to the case of this thesis. It then goes 
on to give an introduction to rhetorical action and its explanatory power with regard to NATO 
enlargement. The main argument is that, with some modifications, the theory of rhetorical 
action seems suitable to explain Spain’s entry into NATO and the Norwegian policy on this 
issue.        
2.1 Theoretical framework 
An important contribution to the debate on NATO enlargement has been provided by Frank 
Schimmelfennig. His focus is on the Eastern enlargement and his study may be broken down 
to two main arguments. The first is that the main explanatory factors in the expansion of 
NATO and the EU are not constellations of power and interests but, on the contrary, the 
constitutive liberal rules of the Western international community. The second is that these 
community rules have influenced enlargement through rhetorical action, which is the strategic 
use of arguments.
22
  
This approach is chosen because it provides valuable insight into the question of Spanish 
membership in NATO. The logic of rhetorical action is applicable to this case in two different 
ways. Directly applied, it helps explain how Spain eventually achieved membership. 
Additionally, if we turn the argument around, it explains many of the characteristics of the 
                                                 
21
 Marc Trachtenberg, The Craft of International History: A Guide to Method (Oxfordshire: Princeton University 
Press, 2006), 30, 39. 
22
 Frank Schimmelfennig, The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 3. 
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Norwegian policy and how reluctant member states managed to exclude Spain from the 
Alliance for years, even in the face of strong pressure from the dominant power.   
Other alternatives do, of course, exist. On the one hand, realist explanations continue to 
provide valuable knowledge of the enlargement of NATO. Many such studies explain NATO 
enlargement as a result of supreme US bargaining power.
23
 Schimmelfennig himself admits 
that the decision to enlarge NATO may very well be attributed to US dominance in the 
Alliance. He claims, however, that such rationalist arguments cannot explain the whole 
process of enlargement.
24
 The same goes for the case of Spain. US interest in Spanish 
membership may explain why Spain eventually was admitted into the Alliance, but not why it 
was excluded for so long, or why the US did not pressure weaker states to accept Spanish 
membership. On the other hand, constructivist approaches explain NATO enlargement as 
international socialisation. Once a state has come to share the community’s values and norms, 
it is accepted as a member.
25
 Such approaches has gained momentum since the 1990s, but has 
been criticised for taking states’ acceptance of international norms and values for granted.26 
As the analysis will show, the assumption of automatic inclusion is another weakness inherent 
in such approaches. Schimmelfennig, however, does not make such presumptions, as is 
explained in the next section of this chapter. In combining rationalist and constructivist 
arguments, he is able to provide a more thorough explanation of the enlargement of 
international organisations. Several of his arguments can also be found in other studies of 
NATO expansion.
27
  
A weakness in Schimelfennig’s approach does nonetheless exist. Focus is put on two different 
stages of the enlargement process, the initial preferences of member states and the final 
outcome. On the period in between, however, Schimmelfennig is rather vague. By providing 
an excellent example of this middle stage, the case of Norway and Spain makes a contribution 
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to the theoretical approach. My argument is that at this stage, the role of the gatekeeper is 
essential. What is meant by “turning the argument around” is that the focus is shifted to a 
state’s ability to prevent other states from achieving membership. With the use of strategic 
argumentation, instead of letting itself be shamed into accepting new memberships, Norway 
managed to exclude Spain from NATO by relying on the very same type of strategic 
argumentation. In this situation Norway played the role of the gatekeeper.  To exercise 
gatekeeping is by Crombez, Groseclose and Krehbiel defined as an actor having “a unique, 
unilateral, procedural right to enforce the status quo”.28 In this thesis the term will be used 
about Norway’s role in preventing Spanish NATO membership. Because of strong opposition 
both inside and outside the ruling party the gap between domestic and foreign policy was 
bridged by the use of strategic argumentation. The result of this was that Norway, by 
demanding certain democratic credentials from the Spanish regime and assuming the 
authority to judge whether these had been met or not, enforced the status quo.  
2.2 Rhetorical action 
When analysing the Eastern enlargement, Schimmelfennig highlights two apparently 
conflicting observations. The first is an initial policy outcome that reflects the distribution of 
material bargaining power and self-interested state enlargement preferences. The second is an 
eventual policy outcome that, on the contrary, reflects the collective identity and social norms 
of an international community. The choice to include the Central and Eastern European 
countries (CEECs), he argues, was not a rational one. First of all, seen as a whole, the 
expected costs of the Eastern enlargement were higher than the expected benefits. Second, 
both organisations already had efficient institutional forms for their relations with the CEECs. 
Finally, he claims that neither the supporters within the organisations nor the CEECs 
themselves possessed the bargaining power to compel the more reluctant member states to 
accept enlargement. Combined, these factors caused both the EU and NATO to initially reject 
the CEECs’ demands of full membership. A few years later, however, accession agreements 
with many of the CEECs had been opened. Any attempt to explain the decision-making 
process on enlargement must be able to link and reconcile these contradictory facts. 
Schimmelfennig argues that “rhetorical action” is a mechanism able to do that.29 
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Rhetorical action is according to Schimmelfennig “the strategic use and exchange of 
arguments to persuade other actors to act according to one’s preferences”.30 An important 
presumption for this mechanism is the existence of both actors intent on securing national 
interests and an institutional, normative environment. In such an environment political actors 
have to refer to common values and norms to gain the legitimacy that is needed to advance 
their goals. At the same time, however, rational political actors can use strategic 
argumentation to reduce the constraints of legitimacy by manipulating these values and 
norms. Finally, and most importantly: Political actors are, through the strategic use of value-
based and normative arguments, able to achieve a collective outcome different from the one 
that would have resulted from the distribution of power and interests alone. Every 
international organisation has its own institutionalised standard of political legitimacy to 
which members have to adhere. It is based on the values, norms and ideological beliefs of the 
political community, and defines the rights and duties of the member states. This does not 
mean, however, that political actors take this standard of legitimacy for granted or as a moral 
imperative. Rather, Schimmelfennig assumes that it is regarded as a resource that may be used 
to strengthen political influence and advance political goals.
31
  
2.2 Enlargement of NATO and rhetorical action 
If we follow the logic of rhetorical action, NATO enlargement can be seen as the result of the 
CEECs and their supporters within the Alliance using arguments based on community norms 
and values to shame their opponents into compliance.
32
 Schimmelfennig argues that national 
self-interest and the distribution of power were what shaped the early stages of the 
enlargement process, but that the final outcome was the result of community rules and 
rhetorical action.
33
   
Material self-interest in security and welfare provides a reasonable explanation for the initial 
preferences of members and potential candidate states alike. The preferences of the member 
states reflected the varying degree of interdependence with the candidate countries, which 
again varied with geographical proximity. For the CEECs, on the other hand, membership was 
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attractive because it could increase welfare and security. Initial preferences were, in other 
words, a result of individual calculations of national interests. The same can be said for the 
initial result of the enlargement process: association with NATO through the Partnership for 
Peace programme and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). These agreements 
opened up for closer cooperation in fields of mutual interests while at the same time denying 
the CEECs decision-making power and the security guarantee of full members. As such, they 
mirrored the superior bargaining power of the enlargement sceptics vis-à-vis the supporters 
and the CEECs themselves. The distribution of power and preferences is not, however, 
sufficient to explain the move from association to full membership. One the one hand, US 
superior bargaining power may account for the decision to include the CEECs in NATO. Why 
the US initially rejected the enlargement proposals and later became the CEECs strongest 
supporter within the Alliance, on the other hand, cannot be rationalised simply as a calculation 
of national self-interest.  
Constructivism, however, does provide a credible explanation of this and of the final 
outcome. NATO is, according to this perspective, an organisation of the Western international 
community. One of the main activities of the Alliance in this regard is to socialise outside 
states to its rules, which are based on the identity, norms and values of this community. When 
a state has adopted these, it should be regarded as a member of the Western community and 
thus be entitled to join its organisations. The rules would not be enough though. According to 
Schimmelfennig, rhetorical action was necessary to compel the reluctant members to adhere 
to the rules.
34
                  
As Schimmelfennig shows, the CEECs used a range of rhetorical strategies. One of their main 
tactics was to appeal strongly to the values and norms of the Euro-Atlantic liberal community. 
Through public speeches, interviews and articles addressed to NATO and its members, they 
accentuated their democratic norms and values. Repeatedly they defined themselves as part of 
Europe, and as an indisputable part of the Western community. Democratic achievements 
were highlighted, while stressing the instability in the region. Interdemocratic solidarity was 
essential, they claimed, for the future of Europe. For this reason, and because of earlier 
practice and promises, NATO was obliged to accept them as members.
35
 If they did not accept 
enlargement, the member states would be acting inconsistently and betraying the values and 
norms to which they were committed. In short, they would be endangering their reputation as 
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community members. As a consequence of this, Schimmelfennig claims, the reluctant 
members were shamed into accepting Eastern enlargement.
36
  
In this way, the Eastern enlargement is explained as a result of egoistic calculations of self-
interests, community rules and values, and strategic argumentation. Though Schimmelfennig 
focuses mainly on this specific round of enlargement, he claims that some of the results of his 
study can be generalised to the entire enlargement history of the major West European 
regional organisations.
37
 The focus on strategic argumentation ensures that the approach is not 
only applicable, but in fact valuable for the case of Spanish membership in NATO. With the 
addition of the element of gatekeeping, the logic of rhetorical action seems well suited to 
explain Spanish accession and, more importantly, essential elements of the Norwegian policy 
on this matter.   
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3.0 Historical background 
74 years ago General Francisco Franco declared his victory in the Spanish Civil War. A failed 
coup d’état in July 1936 was followed by 989 days of bitter war, ending in almost half a 
million dead and as many refugees. With the help of Hitler and Mussolini, the rebel army 
defeated the Republic. The result was almost 40 years of dictatorship,
38
 the existence of which 
determined the nature of Spanish-Norwegian relations.   
Norway’s direct involvement in the Spanish Civil War was modest. The Civil War would, 
however, have an important impact on the Norwegian society. For a long time it was one of 
the main topics of public debate, dominating the front pages of all the largest newspapers.  In 
its wake followed public mobilisation, artistic engagement, political division, crisis of 
government and diplomatic complications.
39 
The Norwegian political left had sided strongly 
with the Republic during the Civil War, and ideological opposition to the Spanish regime was 
widespread. This was reflected in a strong and lasting emotional commitment and made 
normalisation of relations with Franco’s regime problematic. Franco’s sympathy and 
cooperation with the Axis powers during the Second World War further compounded the 
matter.
40
 Should Norway oppose Spain through unilateral or international campaigns, or 
should relations with the regime be normalised? During the post-war years this was one of the 
questions in foreign relations that got the most attention.
41
  
3.1 Solidarity 
With the increasingly belligerent attitude of Hitler’s Germany and the expansionist intentions 
of Fascist Italy, the Spanish Civil War broke out at a time of growing tension in Europe. The 
political divisions of the conflict corresponded closely to those of contemporary Europe, and 
each of the two Spanish camps looked to its European counterparts for help. This meant that 
after only a few weeks the conflict had transcended the borders of Spain.
42
 In Norway, the 
Civil War set off a massive campaign of solidarity. Enthusiasm and sympathy for the Spanish 
cause was widespread and lead to the first massive international act of solidarity in 
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Norwegian history.
43
  
 The aid was for the most part organized by the labour movement and the parties on the Left, 
and came in two very different forms. The first was humanitarian aid, shipments of sanitation 
and hospital equipment, food and clothes to the civilians. The second was of direct or indirect 
military character and organized illegally. Though the numbers are uncertain, it is believed 
that approximately two hundred Norwegians joined the international brigades and fought for 
the Republic.
44
 The solidarity work clearly illustrated the ideological dimension and the 
emotive power of the Spanish conflict. While the enthusiasm and generosity were ample 
amongst the people on the political Left, the Conservatives in Norway were at best lukewarm 
in their support, sometimes directly hostile to the relief work and the fundraising campaigns. 
One might assume that most would support campaigns in favour of a legally elected 
government. This question, however, was more complicated than that. Many feared Stalin and 
Communism more than they did Fascism and Nazism and, though exceptions existed, the 
Conservatives kept the relief work for Spain at arm’s length.45 
While its party organisation mobilised for active solidarity for Spain, the Labour Government 
chose to follow the policy of non-intervention initiated by their French and British colleagues. 
Norway took the commitments of this agreement seriously, and as the autumn of 1936 passed 
an increasing number of measures to maintain neutrality were taken.
 46
 The workers’ 
movement’s fury over the coup and their commitment to the Republic found an outlet through 
the comprehensive relief work. At the same time, it helped lessen the pressure on the 
government’s policy. During the first weeks of the War the Committee for Cooperation 
between Landsorganisasjonen i Norge (the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions) and 
Arbeiderpartiet (the Norwegian Labour Party) established an internal panel that would take 
responsibility for the management and coordination of the fund-raising.  The extent of the 
campaign, however, demanded efficient organisation, and the work needed a wider and more 
neutral platform. Thus, at the end of October 1936, the panel initiated the creation of a larger 
committee to lead a nationwide fundraiser. This led to the establishment of Spaniakomiteen 
(the Norwegian Committee for Spain). With the new committee, the level of activity 
increased dramatically. In a matter of months the Committee for Spain had more than 110 
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local groups and managed to organise the most professional, nationwide act of solidarity 
Norway had ever seen.
47
  
Franco’s dictatorship survived the Second World War and the perseverance of the regime 
became a traumatic topic for the Norwegian Left. After five years of German occupation the 
hatred towards the Spanish authoritarian leader had not subsided. The fact that one of Hitler’s 
allies remained in power was regarded as an atrocity, as was the way in which he kept Spain 
in his iron grip.
48
 This would come to influence Norway both in bilateral relations with Spain 
and in international cooperation. 
3.2 Bilateral Relations  
Despite the fact that an increasing degree of normalisation did take place during the first post-
war decades, the relationship between Norway and Spain remained tense and cool as long as 
Franco remained in power. Norway was usually one of the last countries to formalise any kind 
of bilateral agreement with the regime, even though it had great economic interests in the 
Iberian Peninsula.
49
 Opposition against any cooperation with Franco’s Spain was especially 
strong during the first years after the Second World War. At the time, the Norwegian 
Government wanted as little official contact with the regime as possible. Private firms 
nevertheless ensured that trade between the countries resumed after the War ended. By 1947 
partial diplomatic representation was also restored. The main reason for not breaking all 
bonds with Spain was economic. Trade-relations between Norway and Spain had traditionally 
been good, and cooperation had been far closer in the economic field than in any other. After 
the War, it was primarily in the area of trade that the two regimes maintained good relations. 
There were times when the Norwegian attitude towards Spain, especially in the UN, caused 
difficulties for Norwegian exports and shipping. But even so, trade never decreased 
dramatically.
50
 As the distance to the War increased and the rest of the world improved 
relations with Spain, relations between Norwegian and Spanish authorities were gradually 
normalised.
51
 After 1950 Norway adopted a more conciliatory policy on bilateral agreements 
with Spain. Trade and diplomatic relations were normalised through official agreements. This 
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appeasement was concluded with the cultural accord of 1959. The debate surrounding this 
accord nevertheless points to the controversy surrounding the relation with Franco’s Spain at 
the end of this period.  
This process of normalisation took place in a context of domestic protests, on the one hand, 
and expectations of closer cooperation between the two countries from both Spanish and 
Norwegian business interests, on the other. Two organisations distinguished themselves in 
this debate. While Rederforbundet (the Shipowners’ Association) fought for normalisation of 
relations between the two countries, Spaniakomiteen (the Committee for Spain) wanted 
Norway to maintain a policy of demonstrative distancing. Both organisations were active and 
influential in putting the Spanish question on the agenda, thus putting pressure on the 
Government.
52
 The Government itself was for many years torn on the issue of Spain. During 
the Civil War, sympathy for the Republicans had extended far into the Labour Party, and it 
was with a heavy heart that some of the ministers had accepted the Norwegian policy.
53
 The 
fact that the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister had belonged to the group of politicians 
personally invested in the Spanish question would prove important for the Norwegian stance 
in international organisations.
54
 
3.3 International cooperation 
For many years Norway stood out among the Western European countries as “Spain’s 
Number One Enemy”. At the end of the 1940s it was given this epithet by both Conservative 
and Communist papers, and in the next decade even by Franco himself.
55
 Norway sought the 
most restrictive standpoint bilaterally, in the UN, the OEEC and most clearly in NATO. A 
certain normalisation eventually did take place, and the Norwegian Government gradually 
resigned their resistance within the UN and the OEEC. But this does not amount to a reversal 
of Norway’s particular position with regards to the Spanish question. As a clear illustration of 
this, a spokesman of Norwegian business interest declared at the end of the 1950s that “since 
the War our attitude towards Franco’s government has not only been reserved, but outright 
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aggressive”.56 The next sections will explore the Norwegian policy towards Spain within UN, 
the OEEC and NATO.        
3.3.1 The UN 
The Norwegian policy on Spanish membership in the UN underwent great changes during the 
period from 1946 to1955. For the first four years after the War, Norway maintained a firm 
attitude towards the question of Spanish accession to the UN. The country’s policy on the 
matter was offensive, and the Government took initiatives to prevent the authoritarian regime 
from joining.
 57
 In 1946, following a Norwegian initiative, Resolution 39 was passed in the 
UN. This resolution condemned the Spanish government, claiming it had actively hindered 
the efforts of the allies during the Second World War. It ascertained that the Spanish 
government did not represent the Spanish people, and recommended that Franco’s regime 
should be excluded from membership in the UN and all its sub-organizations until a new, 
acceptable government was established. Finally, the resolution encouraged all members of the 
UN to withdraw all accredited ambassadors and ministers from Madrid.
58
 The following 
years, this resolution would be the topic of a lot of debate within the organisation. Before 
long, the tense international situation and US pressure forced many of the UN members to 
aim for a softer policy towards Spain and opt to revoke Resolution 39. Norway consistently 
opposed this, even when it was the only Western European country to do so.  
Domestic factors were decisive for this policy. The Labour leadership, the majority in 
Parliament and large fractions of the population wanted UN action against Franco. 
Additionally, Norway’s new allies acted cautiously and did not push for the country to change 
its policy, despite the fact that Norway voted with the Eastern bloc in 1949. From 1950 to 
1952 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had to balance internal and external interests to a greater 
extent than before. The tense international situation made the Government considerably more 
determined to follow their allies. The US now actively tried to revoke the resolution against 
Franco, and wanted Norway to vote in favour of withdrawing the resolution. Simultaneously, 
influential groups within Norway fought to maintain the firm policy on Spain. The abstentions 
of 1950 and 1952 were results of this compound pressure. After 1950, however, even 
abstention stood out as demonstrative behaviour towards Franco’s regime. Spanish authorities 
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reacted strongly when the Nordic countries refrained from voting in 1952, and accused 
Norway of causing the abstentions. One might argue, therefore, that the Norwegian policy of 
this period did not represent a complete break with the restrictive policy from the previous 
period. By 1953, however, the Norwegian standpoint had changed.
 59
 The main reason for this 
change was the so-called principle of universality. The majority of Norwegians now felt that 
the UN should be an organisation for all the states in the world, and in 1955 Norway voted to 
accept Spain as a member.
60
  
3.3.2 The OEEC 
Spanish accession to the OEEC took place gradually, from restricted participation in the 
organisation’s agricultural cooperation in 1954, to observer status in 1958 and full 
membership in 1959.
61
 Through all these stages the Norwegian policy was wavering and 
dependent upon the stand of the other members. Unlike in the UN or NATO, Norway never 
chose to swim against the current in this organisation. Norway did, however, belong to the 
group of countries with the most restrictive stand also in the OEEC. Belgium and, to a certain 
degree, Sweden were more willing to voice their concerns about Spanish participation in the 
organisation. The Norwegian Government seemed to find it difficult not to side with countries 
willing to oppose Spain, having been one of Franco’s main opponents on several occasions. 62  
The question of Spain in the OEEC attracted very little attention in Norway, something that 
may seem strange. The fact that the issue for the most part was treated confidentially in 
private meetings was probably important. But not even when the fact that Norway had voted 
for full Spanish membership was known, did many critical voices arise. This suggests that 
saying yes to Spanish membership in the OEEC was not seen as a departure from the 
restrictive line against Franco. It must have been easier for Norwegian politicians to follow 
the majority of the organisation on an issue where the domestic opposition was weak. 
Business interests, on the other hand, were heard and considered. Norwegian shipping was 
clearly better served with Spanish membership than without.
63
 Economic considerations were 
most likely determinant for Norway’s willingness to accept Spain into the cooperation. The 
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economic ties between the two countries were already strong, despite the political 
disagreement.
64
 It has also been claimed that Norwegian opposition to admitting Spain into 
NATO may have influenced the question of membership in the OEEC. The fact that Norway 
decided to follow the other members and not to stand out may be interpreted as a form of 
compensation for the country’s attitude in NATO, where moral political considerations were 
seen to be so much more important.
65
               
 3.4 NATO 
When Norway joined NATO in 1949, Spanish membership was out of the question. Foreign 
Minister Halvard Lange made this perfectly clear when he announced that “the question of 
Spain is quite another than that of Italy, which was decided before we joined. One cannot 
imagine that Socialist ruled countries will vote for Spain's participation. We will in any case 
vote against. If we have to stand alone, we will”. It seems that this was an attitude that found 
support both in Parliament and in the public opinion. The declaration of the Foreign Minister 
was also a promise to the NATO opposition within the labour movement. It was necessary to 
convince the security policy opposition that Norway would not accept Spain as an ally. In a 
statement to the American news agency Associated Press in March 1949, Lange declared that 
Norway opposed Spain joining NATO because it would “weaken the foundation of the 
alliance, which was created to defend democracy”. This was the main argument for 
Norwegian opposition to Spanish membership as long as Franco remained in power.
66
       
In the early 1950s, increasingly convinced that Spain was essential for the defence of Western 
Europe, the US Government were reconsidering the Spanish question. As a result the Truman 
administration started negotiating a bilateral agreement in order to link the Francoist regime to 
the Western system. The outcome of these negotiations was the Pact of Madrid, which took 
the form of three separate executive agreements that guaranteed economic and military aid for 
Spain. In return, the US was to be permitted to build and use air and naval bases on Spanish 
territory.
67
 The increasing US interest in Spain led to fears that the Americans might press to 
include the country in the Alliance. Norway kept a low profile, however, and did not object 
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when military negotiations with Spain were opened. The lack of reaction indicates that the 
Norwegian Government may have seen the Madrid Pact as an alternative to NATO 
membership.
68
 For the US, though, this was not the case. The possibility of including Spain in 
NATO was still on the US agenda. The issue was discussed at a National Security Council 
(NSC) meeting in 1954, where the Government recommended postponing the ultimate 
objective of Spanish membership because it did not seem possible in the foreseeable future. 
Eisenhower himself declared that there was no point in discussing Spanish accession because 
of the hostile attitude of many NATO members, especially the Scandinavian and Benelux 
countries. The issue was therefore put aside.      
A year later the question was nonetheless raised again. In June 1955 the US Senate passed a 
motion where they urged the State Department to promote the admission of Spain in NATO. 
Though this motion did not have a binding force, it forced the Eisenhower administration to 
reopen the debate. The same happened in 1957, when the House of Representatives 
unanimously passed a resolution arguing for an attempt to include Spain in the Alliance. This 
meant that discussions regarding the Spanish question intensified in the Western countries.
69
 
In Norway the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs opposed the suggestions 
vehemently. In 1955 and 1957 both the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister publicly 
opposed Spanish membership. This introduced a period where Norway would play a more 
decisive role. Norwegian influence increased, not because of any change in the Norwegian 
stance, but because of decreased resistance in other NATO countries.
70
  By 1957 most of the 
allies were positive, or at least not negative, with regard to including the Spaniards. Both 
Britain and France, previously among the strongest opponents of Spanish membership, had 
taken more flexible stances.
71
 Norway now assumed the role as the main opponent of Spanish 
membership in NATO. During 1956 and 1957 Norway repeatedly confirmed its opposition. 
By the end of 1957 only Norway, Denmark and Iceland opposed Spanish membership, and it 
was indicated that Denmark and Iceland would follow Norway if it decided not to vote against 
Spain. According to American and Spanish sources, the verdict was clear: the Norwegian 
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stance was decisive in blocking Spanish participation in NATO.
 72 
The Eisenhower 
administration decided not to rush the matter. Secretary of State Christian Herter declared that 
“the United States will continue as appropriate to discuss the question of Spanish membership 
with other NATO members. Although it does not appear wise for us to press openly the 
question of Spanish membership at present, it is a question to which we are devoting a great 
deal of thought”.73  
The fact that the issue was still on the US agenda was perfectly clear to the Norwegian 
Government. From 1958 to 1960 a number of enquiries reached the Norwegian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, where the US asked whether the policy had changed or not. This suggests 
that Norway was the reason why Spanish membership was not treated officially at NATO 
meetings during this period. Normal procedure within the organisation was that such issues 
would not be addressed if it was known that one of its members would vote negatively. 
During the spring of 1959 an alternative solution was suggested. A committee could be 
established, to give an account of and discuss the question of Spanish membership closely. 
Norway immediately opposed the idea. This advance demonstrates the fact that powerful 
groups within NATO now wanted Spanish participation. The quick response also illustrates 
the uncompromising Norwegian stance.
74
 Even when Danish support could no longer be taken 
for granted, Norway maintained its strong opposition.
75
  
It is generally agreed that domestic considerations were the main reason for the Norwegian 
policy.
76
 The consensus within the Labour Party and the political leadership was decisive for 
the consistent attitude towards Spanish entry to NATO. The prevailing reluctance to accept 
undemocratic allies, combined with the emotional Spanish question, gave the issue a special, 
symbolic role in Norwegian politics. Evidence of this can be found in the fact that this was the 
only time Norway threatened to use its veto.
 77
 Additionally, Norway would have no direct 
security advantages from Spanish participation. The political leadership was worried that 
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Spanish membership could increase focus on the Southern flank, and that the Northern areas 
would be given less priority. This geopolitical consideration may have influenced the 
Norwegian policy.
78
 Aside from the burden of taking this stance alone, also external factors 
weighed against Norway accepting Spain as a member of the alliance. The détente period in 
international politics from the mid 1950s, combined with conflicts within the organisation, 
made it easier for the Norwegian government to choose its own policy in NATO.
79
 Moen and 
Sæther claim that Norway faced strong pressure from the US to accept Spanish membership.
80
 
Documents from the American Ministry of Foreign Affairs show, however, that the US took 
the Norwegian stance seriously and was not willing to use any harsh measures to make the 
Norwegians change their position.
81
 
The Eisenhower administration continued to study the question of Spanish membership for 
years. Lecea assumes that, due to the relentless opposition, the question gradually faded away 
thereafter.
82
 This, however, was not the case. On the contrary, the US kept inquiring about 
possible changes in the Norwegian position and suggesting different moves that would forge 
some kind of connection between NATO and Spain.
83
 But the Norwegian stance did not 
change, and the US attempts did not lead anywhere. In 1973 Norway prevented the NATO 
fleet from visiting Barcelona, and a year later a Spanish naval vessel from joining the NATO 
fleet at sea.
84
 Foreign Minister Lange had kept his promise from 1949; The Government 
would not accept Spain as a NATO member, even if Norway was the only one left to object.   
The result was that when Franco died in 1975, Spain was still outside the Alliance. The 
question was now what would happen next.    
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4.0 There is a price to pay  
Franco’s death in November 1975 and the gradual dismantling of the authoritarian regime 
were met with high expectations of democratic progress, both from the Spanish people and 
the international community.
85
 Coinciding with the cooling relationship between the two 
superpowers of the Cold War
86
, the death of Franco assured that the question of Spanish 
membership in NATO was, now more than ever, on the agenda.  
This chapter analyses the Norwegian policy during the first years after 1975. Previous 
research seems to assume that Norwegian resistance to Spanish accession to NATO died with 
Franco.
 87
 The main argument of this chapter, however, is that Franco’s death in itself did not 
have much influence on the Norwegian stance. Norway, acting as a gatekeeper for NATO, 
demanded evidence that Spain had become a fully fledged democracy before they would 
adjust their position.  
4.1 A step in the wrong direction 
The months leading up to the death of Franco were characterised by increasing efforts on the 
part of the United States to create a connection between Spain and NATO. In April the US 
contacted the Norwegian administration. Linking Spain to NATO, they argued, would help 
keep Spain on a stable and moderate course. During negotiations concerning the renewal of 
the Madrid Pact, Spain had expressed wishes to establish closer connections to NATO and for 
the members of the Alliance to recognise the importance of Spain’s contribution to the 
defence of Western Europe. From the American perspective it was deemed important, with 
regard both to the Spaniards themselves and the public opinion, to declare that the possibility 
of a Spanish role in the Alliance did exist. In closing, the Norwegians were told that all the 
members of the Alliance should consider what steps might be taken, to pave the way for a 
Spanish connection to NATO.
 88
  
Barely a month later, a new enquiry from the Americans reached the Norwegian Government. 
A communiqué from the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) meeting in Brussels was now 
being drafted, and the US administration wanted Norwegian support for it to express that 
Spain, through cooperation with the US,” continued to play an important role in support of the 
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NATO defence effort”. 89 When the American suggestion was discussed during a NATO 
meeting of the Ministers of Defence there was general agreement amongst the European allies 
that Spain’s importance to NATO defence should not be highlighted. The Norwegian, Danish 
and Dutch Foreign Ministers preferred Spain not to be mentioned at all, while others felt that 
it was necessary to avoid the impression that Spain was joining the Alliance.
90
 In the end, the 
formulation agreed upon differed significantly from the original American suggestion in that 
it confirmed that the military arrangement between the US and Spain “remained outside the 
NATO context”.91     
The US initiatives mentioned above did not lead anywhere. With Franco still in power many 
member states, and most certainly Norway, were very sceptic about the creation of any clear 
link between NATO and Spain. The initiatives are nonetheless a good demonstration of the 
role the US played as a driving force for Spanish membership in NATO. This was a role the 
US maintained, as the next chapters will show, right up until the moment Spain joined the 
Alliance. The Norwegian reluctance to even mention Spain in connection with NATO was, on 
the other hand, a clear indication of the continuation of the restrictive policy towards Spain. 
There was to be no doubt about how the Norwegian authorities felt about forging connections 
between NATO and Spain, or that rhetorical action was a part of the Norwegian strategy.         
During a NATO summit in May 1975 Prime Minister Trygve Bratteli made the following 
statement:  
[...] Our security is also highly dependent on the political and moral 
strength of our societies. In the declaration which we signed a year ago we 
recall that we have proclaimed our dedication to the principles of 
democracy, respect for human rights, justice and social progress. The 
events last year which relieved our alliance of two totalitarian regimes 
were strongly welcomed. These events also relieved the Alliance of the 
liability of an anachronistic colonial policy which harmed the image of 
NATO in the world. To establish a link between NATO and Spain in the 
present circumstances, would in the view of my Government be a step in 
the wrong direction. It is our earnest hope that the situation in Spain will 
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undergo changes in a democratic direction in a not too distant future. 
When this happens, Norway would be interested in discussing the question 
of closer relations between Spain and the Western democracies.
92
 
The Norwegian stance was also made clear in bilateral conversations between Norway and 
Spain. At a UN meeting in September the same year, Foreign Minister Frydenlund told his 
Spanish colleague that the recent executions
93
 in Spain had destroyed the efforts of 
normalisation between Spain and Western Europe. Further death sentences and executions, he 
added, would render a normalisation of relations between Norway and Spain impossible.
94
   
In addition to the issue of democracy, the domestic political climate would come to be 
important for the Norwegian policy towards Spanish NATO membership. With Norway’s 
accession to NATO in 1949 the Labour Party broke not only with their own, but with all 
Norwegian foreign policy tradition. For the first time Norway was a member of a defence 
alliance that made the country an active participant on one side of the main division in 
international politics. This realignment also had important effects on political life in Norway, 
not least on the Labour Movement. It was within this movement that the main concerns over 
what was conceived as a major change in foreign policy asserted itself, and where it would be 
difficult to gain support for everything that came with membership in NATO. Foreign and 
security policy were major problem areas which led to friction about the contents of the 
policy, the internal democracy of the movement, and finally caused a division of the Labour 
party, when Sosialistisk Folkeparti (the Socialist People's Party) was formed in 1961.95  
4.2 The Right and the Left: different views, different solutions 
The death of the Spanish Caudillo did not bring about any immediate changes in the 
Norwegian policy. In December 1975 the Norwegian evaluation was that Franco’s death was 
too recent for any realistic judgment on the situation to be made. Prospects for a stable 
democracy in Spain, the Government claimed, were highly uncertain. The hitherto restrictive 
Norwegian policy should therefore be maintained. Spain’s changing situation called, however, 
                                                 
92
 UK National Archives, Kew Gardens, FCO 41 1640, “Norwegian Minister”, 30.05.1975.  
93
 The 25
th
 of September 1975 two members of ETA and three members of Frente Revolucionario Antifascista y 
Patriótico ( the Revolutionary Antifascist and Patriotic Front) were executed, accused of killing a civil guard and 
several policemen. These executions were facilitated by an anti-terrorism decree passed in August the same year, 
imposing the death penalty for crimes of abduction or assassination. Julio Valdeon, Joseph Perez and Santos 
Juliá, Historia de España (Madrid: Gran Austral, 2006), 530.  
94
 UD 33.6/3, bind 6, JN 01855, Notat, ”Spania-spørsmålet i vestlig samarbeid”,01.12.1975. 
95
 Trond Bergh, Arbeiderbevegelsens Historie i Norge 5: Storhetstid (1945-1965) (Oslo: Tiden Norsk Forlag, 
1987), 250-254. 
28 
 
for Norway actively encouraging and supporting the democratic forces within the country. 
With this in mind Norway should express that democratic reforms would contribute to a more 
accommodating Norwegian attitude regarding future cooperation between Spain and the 
Western democracies, also in the field of security policy.
96
 
That this attitude enjoyed public support, and that Spain had not been forgotten by Norwegian 
politicians, was quite clear from the domestic debate. The seventh of April 1976 Spain was 
the subject of the following interpellation in the Norwegian Parliament: “What has Norway 
done and what more can Norway and Norwegians do to strengthen the democratic forces in 
Spain?” This interpellation had been presented by Sosialistisk Venstreparti (the Socialist Left 
Party), a party which has its roots in the left wing of the Labour Movement and with a history 
of opposition towards NATO and Norway’s post-war foreign and security policy.97 Presented 
long before the death of Franco, the interpellation was still a subject of heated debate.  
Withdrawing it had not been an option, despite reports of improvements on the peninsula. The 
situation in Spain, it was claimed, was still one where violence, abuse and torture were parts 
of everyday life. The Socialist Left Party wanted to know what could be done, and how far the 
Government was willing to go in supporting the Spanish democratic opposition. In particular, 
they wanted reassurance that Norway would not make any concessions to the Spanish regime 
within international organizations. Concessions should not be given, they argued, before all 
the democratic demands of the Spanish opposition had been met.
98
  
The Labour Government was not dismayed by the questioning of its approach towards Spain. 
Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund answered the questions of the interpellation thoroughly. 
First of all he highlighted the fact that Norway had been, and still was, the country in Western 
Europe with the most restrictive policy with regard to Spain. He then went on to describe the 
results of this policy. It had, among other things, resulted in the consistent opposition to 
Spanish participation in NATO and the Council of Europe. Repeating the main argument of 
Norwegian opposition, his view was that Spanish participation would have violated the 
purpose clauses of democracy and human rights of these organisations. Another result 
mentioned by Frydenlund was several campaigns against the Spanish regime. The latest came 
as a result of the five executions in 1975, which caused uproar all over Western Europe. The 
Norwegian Government had, he claimed, employed relatively sharp diplomatic measures in 
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order to voice their concern. Whether such campaigns had any effects, he admitted, was hard 
to measure. He claimed, however, that “what a campaign of this kind must have made 
perfectly clear to the Spanish Government, is that there is a price to pay to be accepted in 
Western Europe. This price is the introduction of full democratic rights to the Spanish 
people.
99
  
This would not be the last time the Norwegian Government set forth the demand that Spain 
had to pay the price of democracy to be accepted. It would, on the contrary, come to 
characterise Norway’s role as gatekeeper for NATO. An important point to note is the fact 
that such statements were never accompanied by a definition of what concrete democratic 
steps Spain would have to take before the country could be accepted. This suggests that the 
Norwegian Government may have been setting the bar deliberately high, in an attempt to 
postpone the complicated question of Spanish NATO membership.  
Regarding the future of the relations between the two countries, the Foreign Minister was 
quite clear. The Norwegian stance had not - and would not - change until democratic 
requirements had been met. In an assessment of the need to re-evaluate the restrictive policy 
he admitted that the death of Franco had meant a turning point in the history of Spain. For the 
first time in 40 years the possibility of a democratic development existed. The development 
over the last months, he argued, nonetheless indicated that the political forces influenced by 
Franciosm were still strong. He could not see any decisive moves towards liberalisation and 
democratisation. Because of this insecurity the Government believed that the right thing to do 
was to maintain a wait-and-see attitude. Norway wanted concrete signs of democratic 
progress before making any decisions. The Government were, he assured, monitoring the 
situation closely and wanted to contribute to a real democratic development in Spain.
100
        
As for what Norway could do to support the democratic forces, Frydenlund highlighted the 
role of political parties, the workers movement and relief agencies. Pointing to the fact that 
there are limits to what a government can do without violating the principle of non-
involvement, he argued that much of the support had to go through such organisations. In 
particular, he mentioned the Committee for Spain and praised them for their effort ever since 
the outbreak of the Civil War. In closing he stated that democratic forces in Norway had 
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nothing less than a moral responsibility to support the development of democracy in Spain, 
irrespective of party or organisational affiliation.
101
                        
Frydenlund’s last statement may be interpreted as a small jibe aimed at the parties of the 
Right. This because the old cleavages between the Right and the Left, which had 
characterised the Spanish question during the years of the Civil War, were still evident. The 
only one from the Conservative Party to participate in the debate on this occasion was Paul 
Thyness. He did not directly criticise the Government’s policy, but his comments caused 
heated debate nonetheless. His answer to the two questions of the interpellation, what Norway 
had and could do to help the democratic forces in Spain, was quite simply “not much”102. The 
main responsibility for a country’s governance and form of government rests, he argued, with 
the country itself. As an exception from this rule he mentioned countries like Poland, Eastern 
Germany and Romania, where a foreign power has forced a certain form of government upon 
them. This comment shows that another characteristic from the time of the Civil War still 
persisted. The battle against Communism seemed for the Conservatives more important than 
establishing democracy in Spain. The Spanish and Portuguese dictatorships had in Thyness’s 
opinion held quite unique positions. They were neither Communist nor, he argued, 
particularly brutal. Nevertheless they had lasted for a surprisingly long time. His explanation 
for this was that these regimes in all likelihood had enjoyed stronger popular support than one 
would believe. “Fact is that in the wants of any people, order takes precedence over 
freedom”.103 
On the question of Spanish participation in international organisations Thyness admitted that 
the time was not yet ripe. Spain was still a dictatorship, to claim anything else would be futile. 
But, he argued, to continue to keep the regime politically isolated would be wrong. Thyness 
felt that the time had come to establish connections on every level where positive influence 
was possible. Spain had to feel that the way into the Western European community lay open, 
as long as they took the necessary democratic steps. Norway had to realise, he claimed, that 
not much could be done to change the domestic politics of Spain. What little could be done 
had to be done through political and economic rewards, not through never-ending 
condemnation. Last but not least, he highlighted the fact that democratisation of a country is 
not done over night. Progress would happen slowly, and Norway had to adjust their policy 
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thereafter.
104
 Many of the same arguments regarding limited Norwegian influence and the 
need for encouragement rather than condemnation were proposed by Erland Stenberg, 
representing the traditionally conservative Centre Party.
105
  
Being the two only representatives of the political Right participating in this debate, the 
statements made by Thyness and Stenberg suggest that, like during the Civil War, the Right 
did not show enthusiasm with regard to the Spanish question. They did not directly oppose the 
Government’s policy, but were quite sceptical to getting involved with what they regarded as 
Spain’s domestic concerns. As chapter six will show, the Norwegian policy would be quite 
different with a Conservative Government.  
4.3 American enthusiasm, Norwegian scepticism 
The 28
th
 of April 1976 the Spanish Prime Minister Carlos Arias Navarro, a prominent 
Francoist
106
, held a speech where a schedule for the progress of the young democracy was put 
forth. This did not go unnoticed, and was thoroughly discussed by the NATO delegation in 
Brussels. The American ambassador claimed that the promised measures would entail vast 
progress. A positive attitude from NATO and its members, he argued, could exert a powerful 
influence on the developments in Spain. NATO Secretary-General Luns wholeheartedly 
agreed with this, and stressed the significance of friendly countries making “favourable 
noises” about the Spanish programme. Luns also stated that the time might be ripe for 
indicating an incipient, but highly limited connection between Spain and NATO. This 
connection could come, for instance, in the form of inviting Spanish observers to meetings on 
environmental protection and NATO exercises. These suggestions were received with 
scepticism from the other members of the Alliance, except for lukewarm support from France 
and Germany.
107
 The Norwegian ambassador was more than sceptical, and it would soon be 
clear that neither the speech given by Arias, nor the general development in Spain, were seen 
as “vast progress” in Norway.          
After this meeting a thorough evaluation of the situation in Spain was made by the Norwegian 
Foreign Ministry, and later put forth at the NATO summit in Oslo 20-21 May 1976. The 
Norwegian stance was quite clear. The regime change gave reason, not necessarily for 
optimism, but at least for guarded hope that the way might be paved for the development of a 
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democratic society in Spain. Some progress had admittedly been made, but recent events 
indicated that the Spanish Government’s policy of slow reform had been over-cautious, and 
could lead to polarisation of the political forces in Spain. The danger of liberalisation coming 
to a stand-still also had to be faced. The Norwegian delegation then asked the question of how 
one could impress upon the Spanish authorities the need to continue the reform process, 
without being charged with interference in domestic affairs. Spain had clearly expressed the 
desire for closer cooperation with the Western nations. The answer was therefore, they 
argued, to use the leverage given by this desire to emphasise, in positive terms, the 
interdependence between a continued progress towards democracy and the improvement of 
Spain’s relations with and position in the Western world. A premature acceptance, on the 
other hand, might lessen motivation for further reforms. Norway had so far adopted a cautious 
attitude with regard to expanding the political contacts with the Spanish Government. They 
did not exclude the possibility of Spain eventually taking part in Western cooperation. But the 
price for full acceptance should be the introduction of full democratic rights. This applied in 
particular to the question of establishing a possible link between Spain and NATO.
108
 
This view was repeated when Prime Minister Nordli held a press conference in June the same 
year. Here he emphasised the fact that the Atlantic Treaty states that every member state must 
comply with the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. It had to be 
noted, he argued, that no decisive progress toward democratisation of the Spanish society had 
yet taken place, although certain plans in this regard had now been drawn up. Norway, along 
with a majority of member countries in NATO, he claimed, felt that Spain did not yet meet 
the Treaty’s provisions on democracy. 109 In many ways, Nordli was right.  Strong forces 
within the Spanish army, the law enforcement and the political Right still supported the 
Francoist constitutional system.  Given the uncertainty of how these forces would react 
Franco’s successor, the young King Juan Carlos, did not rush the country towards democracy. 
Already after the first months of 1976 it became clear that the new Prime Minister Carlos 
Arias Navarro, for his loyalty to Franco, lacked the will to make major changes. The slow 
progress towards democracy served to reinforce the left and accelerate the process of 
unification, but is also resulted in a tremendous wave of political activism in the form of 
strikes and demonstrations.
110
 In light of this situation, the Norwegian Government had 
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chosen to adopt a cautious attitude to the internal development in Spain and consequently also 
to the question of Spanish membership in the Western defence alliance.
111
 
Nordli’s reference to the Atlantic Treaty is an excellent example of the Norwegian use of 
rhetorical action. Schimmelfennig argues that the interaction between members and the 
outcome of the decision-making process in an international organisation is affected by the 
community environment in four ways. The first one is that it causes discussions about the 
legitimacy of different preferences and policies. Actors are not only able to, but also to a 
certain degree forced to, use the community ideology as basis for the justification of their 
preferences. The second is that it influences the balance of power within the organisation. The 
actors that pursue preferences in line with the values and norms of the community add 
legitimacy to their actions and thus have increased bargaining power. The third is that 
political actors are forced to be concerned about their image. They are judged by other 
members not only on how well they conform to community rules and norms, but also on how 
credible their argumentation is. Finally, the structure of the international community 
complicates opportunistic argumentation. Because members interact on a regular basis, 
argumentative inconsistencies are easily detected.
112
 This means that it is possible to “shame” 
members into compliance when their preferences are in conflict with community values. 
Because they are concerned about their image they will not want inconsistencies between 
earlier commitments and current action to be exposed. 
These arguments may help explain how Norway was able to maintain its restrictive stance 
with regard to Spanish membership. By turning Schimmelfennig’s use of rhetorical action 
around we can see how Norway was able to assume the role of gatekeeper and thus exclude 
Spain from the Alliance. First of all, Norway was able to justify its attitude with the use of 
principles stated in the North Atlantic Treaty. All members had committed to these principles, 
and they therefore legitimised Norway’s argumentation. Secondly, because Norwegian 
preferences were in line with the community norms and values, other actors could not shame 
Norway into changing its stance. This though, did not stop them trying.  
4.4 David versus Goliath: Norway punching above its weight 
During a meeting in Brussels in October, Secretary-General Luns informed the ambassadors 
that he had received an enquiry about how the Alliance would respond if Spain was to obtain 
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observer status in the North Atlantic Assembly. His intention, he went on, was to reply that 
this was a question the Assembly had to assess directly. Should the answer be positive, 
however, it would not pose a problem as far as the Alliance was concerned. When the others 
seemed to be content with this statement, the Norwegian ambassador reacted strongly. This 
reply, he argued, could be both misused and misunderstood. It would certainly be preferable 
to wait with any kind of response until the Assembly itself had had the opportunity to make a 
statement on the matter. The NATO Council, he said, had always been careful not to interfere 
with the business of the Assembly.
113
 This principle should be applied also to this issue. 
These statements were then given support by the Danish and the British ambassadors.
114
 
This meeting is a good illustration of the Norwegian willingness to speak out, and the fact that 
objections often gained support when stated. Members often had reservations, but were 
reluctant to be the one to voice them. It does not seem like Norway, at this point, had the same 
qualms about objecting or fears of standing alone. We must remember, however, that 
countries discussed these matters in advance of and between the meetings, often signalling 
potential support. Knowledge of such support may have made it easier for Norway to express 
preferences that went against those of the majority or the great powers. It also seems like 
Norway to a certain degree got rhetorically entrapped, got locked in the position as the one to 
object even when others had the same concerns. This would not be the last time that Norway 
was the one to stand out, while other member states afterwards supported the objections.   
In January 1977, NATO flexibility studies, initiated by the US, suggested that Spain’s 
relations to NATO ought to be examined formally. Norway opposed this suggestion 
vehemently. It was the view of the Norwegian Government that the questions concerning 
relations between Spain and NATO should not be discussed in the Executive Working Group 
(EWG) or the Defence Planning Committee (DPC). They constituted “questions of high 
politics” which for the time being should not be included in the defence planning agenda for 
the Alliance.
115
 The Norwegian delegation emphasised that it did not consider the time ripe 
for discussions in NATO that affected Spain's relationship with the Alliance, and that Norway 
would oppose a follow-up work on the flexibility studies should they include these measures. 
Norway did not gain support from the other members in these objections, and were criticised 
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by the American Defence Adviser, Dr. Legere. A single member state, he argued, could not 
prevent a NATO body discussing any question it might wish to raise.
116
 The Norwegians were 
then encouraged to discuss the matter again with their authorities. The Government would not 
adjust their position, however, so when the matter was revisited in Brussels later that month 
the Norwegian stance was confirmed. It now gained partial support from the Danish and 
Italian ambassadors. It was agreed that the issue of Spain would not, for the time being, be 
formally discussed.  
Though the Norwegian ambassador reported back to the Government that the Secretary-
General seemed to have a “certain understanding for the Norwegian view” 117, he may have 
been more than a little exasperated by Norway’s unwillingness to change its position. It 
certainly seems reasonable to assume that he had Norway in mind when he warned that 
“NATO should not set itself up as judge over the democratic development in Spain”.118 It also 
seems reasonable to see this as an attempt at shaming the Norwegians into adopting a more 
flexible attitude towards the issue of Spain. Regardless of what the intentions of the Secretary-
General may have been, the Norwegian authorities did not take the statement to heart.  
By May, the official Norwegian position was that Norway gladly noted the democratic 
reforms that had been implemented in Spain. It was deemed appropriate, however, to await 
the coming elections and the subsequent government formation in Spain. Only then could 
Norway consider whether it was suitable to adopt a more accommodating attitude towards 
closer cooperation between Spain and the Western democracies in the area of security 
policy.
119
  
4.5 Guarding the gates  
Franco’s death in 1975 did not cause the Norwegian policy to change. Instead, Norway 
maintained the restrictive policy and objected to every single initiative that would link Spain 
to NATO.  The repeated argument of Spain having to pay the price of democracy to gain 
acceptance by the Western community, is indeed descriptive of the Norwegian stance during 
this period. It is also a clear example of how rhetorical action was used in attempts to prevent 
Spanish membership in NATO. In assuming the authority to judge whether the demanded, 
though never formulated, democratic credentials had been met, Norway acted as a gatekeeper 
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for the North Atlantic Alliance. The gates were closed, and would remain so as long as Spain, 
in the eyes of Norwegian authorities, was unable to prove itself to be a stable democracy.   
In addition to the issue of democracy, the political climate in Norway may have influenced 
this restrictive Norwegian stance. During the years around 1970, issues concerning the Cold 
War and NATO had been overshadowed by the battle over membership in the EC. Around 
1975, however, a new, intense debate about security policy emerged. One of the reasons for 
this re-emergence was the political radicalisation caused by the conflict over the EC, another 
was the cooling relations between the superpowers and the increased Western involvement in 
the defence of the flanks. According to the critics, US armament in the North would tie 
Norway closer to the superpower's global strategy.
120
 In such a climate it may have been seen 
as unfortunate to bring up another potentially controversial NATO issue, a concern that would 
also be central during the next period.  
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5.0 Not the most ardent proponents  
During the summer of 1977 Spain could celebrate the first democratic elections after almost 
40 years of dictatorship. Franco’s regime, it seemed, had finally been laid to rest. After 
decades of Francoism, formal political democracy was undoubtedly a great achievement. In 
many respects it was nonetheless only a timid beginning.
 121
 Often, the young Spanish 
democracy seemed about succumb to the problems of terrorism, military subversion and 
economic stagnation. All these issues were, to a certain degree, the legacy of General Franco. 
The rigid centralism of his dictatorship and the frequent use of violence in the Basque 
Country were the origins of ETA terrorism. Similarly, his assiduous cultivation of the civil 
war mentality, dividing the country into winners and losers, meant that he did not lack 
supporters who, after his death, portrayed a frenzied aversion against democracy. 
Furthermore, the solution of these problems was complicated by the serious economic 
imbalances left by the Franco regime.
122
 
Both the success and the problems of the young democracy would come to influence the 
Norwegian policy analysed in this chapter. The main argument is that though Norwegian 
authorities after the elections in Spain would no longer directly oppose Spanish membership, 
Norway remained the NATO member with the most restrictive policy towards Spain. Partly 
due to tension within the governing party, and partly due to rhetorical entrapment, Norway 
still acted as a gatekeeper for NATO. Perhaps the policy of this period can best be described 
by a quotation from an internal evaluation made by Norwegian NATO ambassador Rolf T. 
Busch:  
Regarding the question of Spanish membership in NATO it is on the one 
hand clear that we will not oppose this and, on the other hand, equally 
clear that we will not act as the most ardent proponents of membership.
123
 
5.1 New considerations: from democratic doubts to procedural objections 
As the democratic process in Spain advanced, new considerations were introduced to the 
Norwegian evaluation of the membership question. The issue of Spanish membership in 
NATO was complex, it was argued, and had to be seen in relation to Spain's own situation, in 
relation to the Alliance and the East-West context. The internal debate process in Spain about 
membership had not come very far, and there were not yet any expressed desire for affiliation 
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from a democratically elected Spanish government. Neither was it certain that Spain, after the 
coming round of clarification, would see joining NATO as the best alternative. Norway’s 
view was therefore that it was appropriate to postpone the issue until the formation of the new 
Spanish Government and their program was clear. This was a matter that should not be 
rushed. In the meantime, the interests of the Alliance were taken care of through the bilateral 
agreement between the US and Spain. Norway would, however, support any proposal that 
NATO should conduct a thorough assessment of the consequences of Spanish membership. 
And, interestingly enough, such a study should also discuss the possibility of Spain's future 
relationship with the Western defence being arranged through bilateral agreements.
124
 Even 
though the majority of the Alliance now supported Spanish membership, Norway seemed to 
hope that there was another alternative. 
Further considerations were made clear during a Council Meeting in Brussels on 24 October 
when the Spanish question was again raised, this time on the account of a suggestion from the 
Canadian ambassador. The Norwegian ambassador then argued that there was no need, at the 
moment, for any formal debate on the subject. The Norwegian authorities preferred any 
exchange of evaluations and information about this question to be maintained at an informal, 
discrete level. Should the Alliance open up a formal and methodical discussion of Spanish 
membership, one would have to assume that this sooner or later would become publicly 
known. This might create the impression that NATO as an organisation was seeking to 
influence the Spanish decision. This would, in turn, not only make the membership question 
more controversial in Spain, but also create a controversial attitude towards the Alliance as 
such. The Norwegian conclusion was therefore that the Alliance should maintain a positive 
but discrete wait-and-see attitude.
125
  
The American Chargé d’Affairs agreed that the consultations within NATO should be carried 
out with the utmost discretion. Some things, he argued, could nonetheless be done. The social 
democratic parties in Northern Europe should discretely attempt to influence the PSOE
126
 to 
adopt a more agreeable attitude toward membership by explaining what the Alliance stood 
for. Furthermore, members should focus on strengthening bilateral relations with Spain, it was 
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important to “get to know each other better”. The Spaniards were, he claimed, to a certain 
extent still worried that they might be rebuffed by NATO. They would prefer an invitation 
from the Alliance to become a member. The American view was that one had to avoid the 
possibility of Spanish membership being lost just because of a misinterpretation of the attitude 
of member states, or the impression of a negative attitude among member countries causing 
Spain to swing in the direction of non-alignment. It was therefore important that each member 
state made the Spaniards understand that should Spain decide to apply for membership, it 
would be welcomed. With the exception of Norway, Luxembourg and Iceland, all the member 
countries informed that they already had - or soon would – confirm in bilateral conversations 
with Spain that their country would welcome Spain into the Alliance.
127
 
The fact that this was not the first time Norway had been informed that Spain preferred an 
invitation to the Alliance, having received the same report from the embassy in Lisbon 
months earlier
128
, provides a certain perspective to the seemingly positive new stance adopted 
by the Norwegian Government a few weeks later. As of 31 October 1977 the Norwegian 
policy was that the question of Spanish membership in NATO was an internal Spanish 
concern that the Spanish authorities should handle without pressure or advice from abroad. 
Norway should therefore not make any enquiries to Spain about this question. It was another 
matter should they receive a specific request from the Spanish Government about the 
Norwegian stance on the issue. To such an enquiry they would respond positively, provided 
that the NATO countries at such a time agreed that the Alliance should be extended.
129
 
The argument that the decision to join NATO had to be made by Spain, and Spain alone, was 
not a Norwegian one. All the members were very aware that if they seemed to be pressuring 
Spain in any way, then the task of the NATO proponents within Spain would be all the more 
difficult. The reason for this was that national sensitivities demanded that, if Spain was to join 
NATO, then it had to be a Spanish decision made for Spanish reasons, rather than one 
provoked by external pressure or the needs of the Alliance.
130
 The way in which Norway put 
this argument to use, however, certainly differed from that of most members. On several 
occasions the Norwegian authorities used it as justification for opposing Spanish participation 
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in NATO exercises.
131
 Later, as this chapter will show, it would also be used to attempt to 
stall the process when it, in the eyes of Norwegian authorities, seemed to be going too fast.  
The view that Spanish membership perhaps ought to be avoided because of the possible 
negative impact NATO enlargement might have on the relations between the East and the 
West, on the other hand, would not gain appreciation that easily. The General agreement in 
Brussels was that there was no immediate danger of such an impact, and that it would be 
irresponsible to forgo the strengthening of the Alliance Spanish membership would entail. 
Additionally, and a fact of which Norway was quite forcefully reminded, it would not be in 
accordance with the communiqué from a NATO summit in 1976. Here the ministers had 
stated that the Alliance would remain a free association open to all European states devoted to 
the defence of the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples. Norway was 
also reminded of the fact that the right of states to belong or not to belong to treaties of 
alliance was confirmed in the Final Act of Helsinki.
132
 
This is a good example of Schimmelfennig’s point about political actors referring to common 
values and norms to gain the legitimacy that is needed to advance their goals. And, as this 
chapter will show, these particular arguments would also prove another one of 
Schimmelfennig’s arguments; that actors also use strategic argumentation to reduce the strains 
of legitimacy by manipulating these values and norms. Norway would later incorporate these 
points into its own argumentation and use them as justification for its stance, all the while 
making countless attempts to stall the process of Spain’s accession.    
5.2 Less enthusiasm than before 
By the end of 1977 the question of Spanish NATO membership had more or less reached a 
standstill. It was never of the table, but the positions were fixed and whenever the issue was 
brought up it got the same response; Norway was in favour of Spanish membership, but 
objected to initiatives because they were not, in Norwegian eyes, correctly formulated or 
because they would give the wrong impression. 
133
 The situation changed, however, when on 
                                                 
131
 UD 33.6/3, bind 8, JN 000804, Notat, ”Spørsmål om å invitere spanske observatører til å overvære NATO-
øvelsen ”Display Determination”.”, 20.09.1978; UD 33.6/3, bind 8, JN 000804, Inkommet melding fra NATO-
delegasjonen til UD, 20.09.1978; UK National Archives, Kew Gardens, DEFE 241306, “From UKMILREP 
Brussels to Moduk II”, 20.07.1977. 
132
 UD 33.6/3, bind 7, H-JN 000811, Innkommet melding fra NATO-delegasjonen til DU, 08.11.1977. The 
Helskinki Final act was the final act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE, signed 
by 33 states in an attempt to improve relations between the West and the Communist bloc. John Young and John 
Kent, International Relations since 1945:  A Global History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 443.  
133
 UD 33.6/3, bind 8, JN 000804, Notat, ”Spørsmål om å invitere spanske observatører til å overvære NATO-
øvelsen ”Display Determination”.”, 20.09.1978. 
 41 
 
23 February 1981 Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Tejero led a group of the Guardia Civil in an 
occupation of el Congreso de los Diputados (the Congress of Deputies). The attempted coup, 
later known as 23-F, failed, but clearly demonstrated the existence of insurrectionary elements 
within the army.
134
  
In the aftermath of 23-F, reports came of increased interest from the Spanish government to 
accelerate the initial steps aimed at Spanish membership in NATO. The Spanish Government 
had still not made a final decision, but hoped “very soon” to pass a positive resolution. NATO 
members were therefore asked if they within a week's time could announce whether they in 
principle were prepared to react positively to Spanish membership, should the Spanish 
government decide to apply. Before Spain was to make a final decision, they wanted a 
confidential statement from the Secretary-General about whether the member countries would 
welcome a Spanish application. Once again protests came from the Norwegian ambassador, 
pointing to the general consensus that, for a while now, had existed within the organisation 
about responding positively should Spain decide to apply for membership. The approach Luns 
now suggested, he argued, seemed to deviate from the envisioned scenario where the initiative 
should emanate from Spain and Spain alone.
135
  
The fact that the issue now seemed to proceed faster than previously envisioned caused the 
Norwegian Foreign Ministry to carry out a new thorough evaluation of the Spanish question. 
The situation in Spain in the aftermath of the coup was described as a state of "latent coup 
situation", the majority of generals were seen to sympathize with the rebels, and it was 
believed that they would not obey the King if another coup was attempted. Many, including 
Norwegian newspapers, claimed that the coup represented an important test of democratic 
strength, and that Spain had passed with flying colours. According to the Norwegian 
evaluation, however, this was a hypothesis that should be viewed with scepticism. On the 
contrary, they saw the relatively mild reaction to the coup makers as evidence of how weak 
the foundation of democracy in Spain still was. It had to be carefully evaluated, they argued, 
whether one should try to strengthen democracy in Spain by giving the country membership 
in NATO or whether to try to postpone membership until democracy in Spain had been 
strengthened. If the first alternative was pursued, the risk was that NATO might get another 
undemocratic country in their midst. The effect of Spanish membership in NATO, they 
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claimed, might be so small that it would not be enough to prevent another undemocratic 
regime in Spain. It could just as easily be argued that Spain should strengthen its democracy 
and remain democratic in a natural, organic way rather than by the use of NATO membership. 
They admitted that a dismissive attitude from NATO could potentially strengthen the anti-
democratic forces in Spain. This, however, should not be decisive for the Norwegian stance 
towards a Spanish request for membership in NATO. Emphasis should instead be placed on 
the risk of Spain - despite membership in NATO - again falling back to an undemocratic 
regime. The conclusion was that there should be no rush to include Spain in NATO, and that 
Norway therefore would try to ensure that Spain considered all aspects of NATO membership 
before the country formally might apply for such membership.
136
 
When the discussions above were summarised, the note quite simply stated: “It seems like 
Spain is pushing for a fast decision on the question of membership. Norway will not oppose 
membership, but there is currently less enthusiasm than before.”137 To what extent there had 
ever been enthusiasm about Spanish membership in Norway is debatable, but the attempted 
coup certainly triggered new worries about Spain’s democratic credentials. Norway’s role as 
self-appointed gatekeeper for the North Atlantic Alliance, it seemed, was not yet over.        
5.3 Exploiting the argument of democracy: increasing pressure from 
strategic argumentation 
Traditionally, Spain’s concept of national security had differed quite sharply from those of the 
West European members of NATO, in that they shared few of the same defining historical 
experiences. In the post-Franco period these differences would remain. The main threats to 
Spain’s individual security were not defined in terms of the Soviet Union or the Cold War, but 
focused on the British possession of Gibraltar and the Moroccan claim to the Spanish 
enclaves Ceuta and Melilla.
138
 Although Spain made several attempts to address these 
concerns, neither of them would be covered by the NATO guarantee. Spain had, nonetheless, 
reasons for wishing to join the Alliance. One such reason was the domestic unpopularity of 
the Madrid Pacts, clearly imbalanced and by many viewed as a relic of Franco’s regime. More 
important, however, was perhaps the link between NATO and the EC. Despite continuous 
attempts to treat membership in the organisations as separate issues, they were in reality 
closely linked. Membership in the EC was the key aim in Spanish foreign policy and NATO 
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membership, though much more controversial, could be used to exert pressure on states which 
were members of both organisations. With continuing opposition against early membership in 
the EC, the hope was that joining NATO might make the reluctant members look more 
favourable upon EC entry.
139
 The fact that Spain indeed did have its own agenda became ever 
clearer through their use of rhetorical action, something that did not go unnoticed in Norway. 
This seems clear from the fact that the Norwegian State Secretary at one point claimed that 
Spain was “exploiting the argument that NATO membership would help strengthen 
democracy in Spain”. 140       
The increasing interest in NATO membership from the Spanish authorities became obvious as 
Prime Minister Calvo Sotelo and Foreign Minister Perez-Llorca both publicly announced that 
they very soon hoped to make a formal request to NATO for Spanish membership in the 
Alliance. Public statements were increasingly accompanied by appeals to the values and 
norms of the Euro-Atlantic community. Spanish participation in NATO, and to an even 
greater extent the EC, would, they argued, strengthen the democratic forces in Spain. A 
negative attitude from Western Europe towards the Spanish integration efforts, on the other 
hand, could fuel undemocratic attitudes and strengthen the cause of those who argued that the 
country should return to the isolated state experienced during the Franco era.
 141
  
The Spaniards also tried to convince the NATO members, perhaps especially those who had 
questioned the strength of the Spanish democracy, of their democratic credentials. In a 
conversation with the Norwegian delegation in Brussels, Spanish ambassador de Carcer 
emphasised that Spain considered itself, despite the known difficulties they had lived through, 
ready to join the cooperation between the other Western democracies. The democratic process 
was well established, he argued, after the success of two national elections and with ongoing 
negotiations to solve the problems with the provinces that wanted greater autonomy.
142
  
Still the greatest advocate for Spanish membership, the United States welcomed the 
increasing efforts of the Spanish authorities and advised them to go into bilateral consultations 
with the member states. Most members reacted positively to the Spanish inquiries but, 
according to the US, the Spanish Government had reported some uncertainty with regards to 
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the attitude of Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands. This made the Americans react and the 
Norwegian ambassador in Washington was told to report back to his Government that the 
Spaniards felt that they had a genuine need for reinsurance. Such reassurance, they argued, 
should be provided both bilaterally and through Secretary-General Luns. Spain could not take 
the chance of being met with a negative response to their application.
143
   
No more than a day later, Norwegian State Secretary Johan Jørgen Holst was approached by 
the American Chargé d’Affairs, Barkley. The Americans wanted to be fully informed about 
the   Norwegian stance on Spanish membership, all the while emphasising the fact that NATO 
could help the Spanish democracy in a very difficult situation. Maintaining that Norway in 
principle supported Spanish membership, Holst informed Barkley about the results of the 
Norwegian evaluation made in the aftermath of the attempted coup. Interestingly enough, 
some new concerns were also expressed. The fact that one of these concerns was the problem 
of incorporating past Franco generals into NATO's command structure suggests that the 
memory of the Civil War, as outlined in chapter three, was still very much alive within the 
Norwegian administration. Another concern was the fact that it would be very difficult to 
keep the matter secret, and that it would create a lot of problems in Spain as well as in 
Norway should the relationship become known. Holst told Barkley that the matter had been 
handled very discreetly in Norway. The Government had, of course, discussed the issue, but it 
had not been submitted to the Parliamentary bodies.
144
 
The fact that the question of Spanish membership had not been submitted to the Parliament is 
an indication of the Spanish question still holding a special position in Norwegian politics. 
Ever since Norway gained its independence in 1905, the Norwegian foreign policy has been 
designed in close collaboration between the Government and the Parliament - since 1918 
mainly through the Foreign and Constitutional Committee. In most countries, relations with 
other states are primarily the domain of the executive branch, and this close interaction 
between the government and the Foreign Affairs Committee has contributed to the 
distinctiveness of Norwegian foreign policy. Most foreign policy issues of importance were 
presented to and discussed with the Foreign Affairs Committee before the policy was 
developed. The discussions were generally both comprehensive and pointed, and the political 
positions did not always follow party lines. In many important cases, coalitions were formed 
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across them. There was hardly any other area where the cooperation between the Government, 
the parliamentary majority and the opposition was so close and constant.
 145
 When the 
Government did not discuss the issue of Spanish membership with the Parliament it must 
have been for a reason, a subject that will be revisited later in this chapter.    
5.4 Not right now: an issue of timing 
The crisis in Poland in 1980-1981, precipitated by the emergence of the mass movement 
“Solidarity”, posed an insidious threat to Soviet interests in Eastern Europe. Throughout the 
world the fear was that, like on previous such occasions – East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 
1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968 – the Soviet leaders would resort to military force to protect its 
vital security interests.
146
 Being one of the Soviet Union’s next door neighbours, and in the 
light of Soviet threats that Spanish membership might “force” them to make a 
countermove
147
, this situation would also come to influence the Norwegian policy. Evidence 
suggests that it was both a genuine concern and later on an excuse to stall the Spanish 
accession.  
During a Council meeting in NATO at the end of March 1981 a large majority of the 
ambassadors agreed that the Secretary-General could informally respond to the Spanish 
Government that the Alliance would be positive to a Spanish request. The only exceptions 
were, again, Denmark and Norway. The two countries did not, however, offer the same 
objections. Denmark, though in principle favourably disposed towards Spanish membership, 
argued that Spain would have to submit a formal application before a decision could be made. 
Before such an application existed, they saw no reason for the Alliance to take a stand. An 
element in the assessment of a Spanish application, they added, had to be that the Spanish 
Government's position on the issue had sufficient support in the Cortes.  
The Norwegian objection was quite another. Norway’s position on the question of Spanish 
membership in NATO was still, in principle, favourable. With regard to this question, the 
Norwegian Government attached importance to the fact that the right of any state to join 
defence alliances had been explicitly expressed in the final act of Helsinki. As to the timing of 
such a move, the Norwegian Government seriously doubted, however, that it would be 
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advisable to pursue the question of Spanish membership just now. The crisis in Poland was 
now in its most acute and possibly also decisive stage. At the same time the follow-up 
meeting of the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in Madrid and 
the fate of the conference on disarmament in Europe were approaching a decisive point. In 
these circumstances it was the view of the Norwegian Government that it was not advisable, 
at the moment, to raise the issue of Spanish membership in the Alliance in a manner that 
would attract public attention. They would, however, not object to the Spanish Government 
being told informally and in full secrecy that the attitude of this alliance towards Spanish 
membership remained a favourable one. It was the Norwegian view, however, that the 
Secretary-General should add that the aspect of the international situation did not make it 
advisable to raise the matter publicly just now. Although the Norwegians in principle still 
responded positively to Spanish membership, they had taken a definite reservation about the 
timing for a possible Spanish decision to apply for such membership. This should be 
expressed in the message he was to convey to the Spanish ambassador.
 148
 
 No other members expressed the view that the issue of membership should be related to the 
international situation. Despite this, the Norwegian concerns were included in the summary 
given to the Spanish ambassador. The response from the other NATO members may not have 
been altogether positive though, because the Norwegian ambassador reported back to Oslo 
that: “We have to face the fact that it is not only the US that would have preferred a statement 
with fewer reservations”.149 Denmark might have gotten the same indications, because two 
days later the Danish objection had already been lifted.  
Though the Danish reservation did not last for long, it caused a rather interesting debate in 
Norway. It was never a reservation Norway agreed with, but, the Foreign Ministry claimed, it 
could be a problem if it got out that Denmark had objected on a certain area and Norway had 
not. It was seen as very fortunate, however, that the Norwegian reservations had been 
included in the summary of Secretary-General Luns.
150
 The fact that not objecting was seen as 
a problem seems to confirm the argument that the Norwegian Government to a certain degree 
was rhetorically entrapped, that stepping out of the role as the main opponent of Spanish 
membership was not an easy thing to do. The evidence suggests, moreover, that there may 
have been more discord within the ruling party than the Government wanted to admit, an 
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issue that will be revisited later in the chapter. Evidence also suggests that Norway was not 
alone in their worry about the international situation. 
During a conversation between the Norwegian and French Foreign Minister, the Spanish 
request for membership in NATO came up. Francois-Poncet agreed with Frydenlund that the 
timing was not particularly fortunate in view of the critical situation in Poland. France, 
however, had enough problems in their relationship with Spain as it was (with the conditions 
in the Basque Country and the EC negotiations), and would therefore not raise any 
objections.
151
 Similar concerns may also have existed in other member countries. Ambassador 
Vibe later informed the Norwegian Government that when the other countries had not 
expressed concern about the timing, it was his impression that this first and foremost was out 
of concern that they might give the impression that they were opposed to Spanish 
membership. A conversation with the German ambassador a few months later confirmed that 
this was also a concern in Germany.
152
  
5.5 Accusations: international situation as cover for Norwegian opposition? 
During a Council meeting in Brussels in June 1981, Luns informed the Permanent 
Representatives that the Spanish ambassador had indicated that the Spanish request for 
membership might come before the end of June, instead of September as they had previously 
hinted. Ambassador de Carcer therefore wanted reassurance that Spain could be absolutely 
certain that the country would be accepted as a member of the Alliance should this initiative 
be taken. Furthermore, de Carcer hoped that the allies could provide an answer within two 
weeks after the request had been received. Ambassador Vibe stated that he was afraid that the 
information now presented on the acceleration of the Spanish initiative would create concern 
in Oslo. In fact, he had been asked to maintain that Norway attached great importance to the 
choice of the right moment for such an application from Spain. Repeating the earlier 
arguments about the international situation, he declared that Norway considered these 
deliberations of even greater importance than before. 
Luns was clearly not very happy with the Norwegian objections, and stated that he sincerely 
doubted how much importance they should grant the situation in Poland. He then pointed to 
the fact that the international situation had been equally difficult at the time of Turkish, Greek 
and West German accession. Spain could not be blamed for the situation in Poland, and the 
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timing would never be perfect, so waiting for such a moment was useless. Luns noted that he 
did not want the Spaniards to get the impression that the international situation was used as a 
cover for opposition against Spanish membership. In Spain, he claimed, this was already a 
concern. Ambassador Vibe was later informed by the Secretary-General that even among the 
allies there was some concern that Norway and Denmark in reality were against Spanish 
membership because of, among other things, the attitude of the Spanish Socialists to NATO.  
Whether the view of the Spanish Socialists was important for the reluctance of the Norwegian 
Government is uncertain. What is certain, however, is that the two socialist parties had been 
in regular contact ever since the Civil War
153
, and that the Labour Government in Norway 
kept a close eye on how PSOE felt about Spanish NATO membership throughout the period 
analysed in this chapter.
154
  
When the Norwegian ambassador later asked Luns whether he should inform the Spaniards of 
the Norwegian considerations regarding the timing, he was told that this could only cause 
concern in the Spanish Government, and should be avoided at all costs.
155
 This warning did 
not, however, prevent ambassador Vibe from giving the Spanish ambassador a full report on 
the Norwegian considerations.
156
 It is perhaps not surprising then, that this would not be the 
last time Norway was accused of harbouring ideological opposition towards Spanish NATO 
membership.  
5.6 No hidden opposition?  
During June 1981 the US several times suggested that a more fundamental reluctance against 
Spanish membership was the basis for the importance Norway attached to the choice of 
timing of the Spanish request for membership in NATO. To draw a parallel between Spain 
and the situation in Poland, they argued, was to make Spain a hostage of the Soviet Union’s 
policy towards Poland. These accusations were thoroughly rejected by the Norwegian 
delegations in both Washington and Brussels. The Norwegian stance was, they argued, that 
democratic Spain had the same right as any democratic country in Europe to solve their 
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security issues through membership in NATO. There was no hidden opposition in Norway 
and the hesitation was no more than an issue of timing.
157
  
Whether all opposition to Spanish membership in Norway was really gone, however, remains 
uncertain. A month before these American suspicions were acknowledged, a report from 
Copenhagen revealed that there was now considerable resistance to Spanish NATO 
membership in Denmark. Resistance existed not only within parties to the left of the Social 
Democratic Government, but also in the party's own left wing. Some still held on to old 
notions, claiming that Spain was not yet a democracy, while others agreed with Norwegian 
considerations regarding the international situation. Even the Prime Minister was reserved 
with regards to Spanish membership now. When the Danish Prime Minister discussed these 
matters with the Norwegian Government, Foreign Minister Frydenlund gave the impression 
that the Norwegian Labour party did not have the same problems.
158
 When the Spanish 
Foreign Minister visited Oslo on 21 June, however, he got another story. After giving a 
thorough report of the situation in Spain, Perez-Llorca asked for the Norwegian stance 
towards Spanish NATO membership. The reply from Frydenlund was that he, at the moment, 
had to be reserved in his answer. Although he personally believed that the membership would 
strengthen democracy in Spain, there were those within the ruling party who would be 
sceptical to Spanish accession, partly because of the crisis in Poland and partly due to the 
internal developments in Spain.
159
  
Frydenlund’s answer to Perez-Llorca suggests that lingering opposition towards Spanish 
membership may still have existed within the Labour Party. What it certain, moreover, is that 
the tensions within the party regarding foreign policy in general at this point were severe. 
From the late 1960s to the late 1970s, the security policy of the Labour Party had, for the most 
part, been uncontroversial. Opposition to NATO still existed within the Labour movement, 
but was not very visible. From 1979 and well into the 1980s, however, it was once again 
made clear how much conflict security policy could cause within the Labour movement. Over 
a period of almost five years, controversy over security policy issues came to dominate the 
debate, reaching unusually high temperatures. Three specific cases, all closely connected, 
were responsible for triggering fierce battles within the party: NATO's decision in December 
                                                 
157
 UD 33.6/3, bind 10, H-JN 000565, Innkommet melding fra NATO-delegasjonen i Brussel, ”Spania og 
NATO”, 18.06.1981. UD 33.6/3., bind 10, H-JN 000569, Innkommet melding fra ambassaden i Washington, 
”Spania og NATO – amerikansk inntrykk av norsk holdning”, 19.06.1981. 
158
 UD 33.6/3, bind 10, JN 00693, Innkommet melding fra ambassaden i København, 14.05.1981. 
159
 UD 33.6/3, bind 10, H-JN 000608, Notat, ”Spørsmålet om spansk NATO-medlemskap. Samtale 21.06.81 I 
Oslo mellom Utenriksministeren og den spanske utenriksminister, Perez-Llorca”, 18.06.1981. 
50 
 
1979 to deploy medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe, the issue of pre-positioning US 
military equipment in Norway, and the question of a nuclear free zone in the North.
160
 What 
made these issues stand out from former feuds and confrontations was the fact that the 
opposition against the official policy was so widespread. While the opposition previously had 
consisted of a small number of NATO opponents, it now spread far into the ranks of NATO 
supporters. The majority of those who now opposed NATO decisions about production and 
deployment of new nuclear missiles, were supporters of Norwegian participation in the 
alliance.
161
 From 1979 to 1980 the opposition was so strong that the Labour Government 
feared that the discontent might undermine both the party and the NATO membership.
162
 
Therefore - lingering opposition against Spanish NATO membership or not - this may not 
have been the best moment for the Labour Government to bring another NATO issue to the 
table.  
5.7 Leaving the gates ajar 
As of September 1981 it was clear that Norway no longer held on to objections concerning 
Spain’s democratic credentials. They did, however, maintain the concerns regarding the 
timing.
 163
 Why these objections now were put to rest is an interesting question. An obvious 
answer is that the events of 23-F did not cause the Spanish democracy to fall apart but, on the 
contrary, caused widespread indignation and would, a year later, lead the PSOE to a 
spectacular electoral victory.
164
 As this thesis has shown, however, democratic progress in 
Spain did not automatically cause the Norwegian stance to soften. Another explanation may 
be that, as the use of rhetorical action from Spain, the US and Secretary-General Luns 
increased, holding on to these concerns now might be endangering Norway’s reputation as a 
community member.   
At the end of September, NATO’s first official response to Spanish application was discussed, 
and whether this should be followed by a council resolution. The only one to object to such a 
resolution was Denmark, a fact which implies that the Spanish question created the same link 
between domestic and foreign policy in Denmark as it did in Norway. The Norwegian 
ambassador reported that he had a certain understanding for the Danish position, but that he 
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had not yet received any instructions. Pointing to the approaching change of government, he 
informed that Norway did not yet have an official stance in the matter. 
165
 This change of 
government, as the next chapter will show, would in many ways change the Norwegian stance 
towards Spanish membership in NATO.   
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6.0 An example to be followed 
The Spanish accession came at a difficult time for NATO. The late 1970s was a period 
characterised by a series of crises within the Alliance, both exposing and actively creating 
serious divisions between the member states. With the Second Cold War as backdrop, one of 
the main threats to the West was within NATO defined as the threat of division among its 
members and a subsequent disintegration of the international political and economic structure 
of Western Europe.
166
 Such fears of division would also come to influence the Norwegian 
policy in the period analysed in this chapter, from the end of 1981 and up until Spain joined 
NATO in May 1982. The main argument is that the Norwegian policy changed with the 
governments; from the objections and stalling characteristic of the Labour dominated period, 
to an emphasis on joining the consensus in the Alliance and even a role as an active proponent 
of Spanish membership under the Conservative Government. An important reason for this 
change was the foreign policy of the new Government. But it was also a result of previous 
promises: Having clung to the argument of democracy for so long, the situation in Spain both 
enabled and forced the Norwegian policy to change. Now that Spain evidently was a 
democracy, Norway’s role as a gatekeeper was over.  
6.1 Changing the tune: new Government, new approach 
As of 29 October 1981 it was clear that Norway would no longer maintain the objections 
concerning the timing of Spanish membership.
167
 The question had been evaluated a few 
weeks earlier, where these objections had been confirmed
168
.  The new evaluation, however, 
stated that Norway previously had been opposed to Spanish NATO membership because 
Spain during the Franco era had been a dictatorship. Now that Spain was a democratic 
country, this objection was gone. Norway would therefore be positive to Spanish NATO 
membership if Spain should apply for it. Spain's entry into NATO would not represent any 
fundamental changes in the international security and defence policy situation. Norway 
understood, however, that Spain would rather be part of a multilateral alliance than 
maintaining the bilateral agreement of the former defence cooperation with the United States. 
Furthermore, Spanish membership in NATO might help to stabilise democracy in the country, 
provide security and give Madrid the opportunity to pursue an independent foreign policy.
169
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Arguably, one of the most important changes that had occurred between these two evaluations 
was the fact that Norway now had a new, Conservative Government. Their foreign and 
security policy suggests that this change in government may have been one of the main 
reasons for this relatively sudden change in the Norwegian stance on the Spanish question. 
The Conservative Party was, during this period, more assertive with regard to their security 
policy than in any other political area. To the new Prime Minister, Kåre Willoch, and many in 
his inner circle, the Soviet Union appeared at the beginning of the 1980s as an existential 
threat. The Prime Minister demanded that no minister should be appointed that did not 
support the agreed policy, the policy of loyalty to NATO. This premise of internal cohesion in 
NATO reflected the Conservative Party’s basic understanding of the Cold War dynamics. The 
Soviet Union had to be kept in check, and the means to achieve this had to be Western 
strength through unity in NATO.
170
  
At this point two things are worth mentioning. Firstly,   Spanish NATO membership was not 
discussed during cabinet meetings after the Conservative Party came to power, a fact that 
suggests that the issue of Norwegian support was obvious or had already been decided while 
in opposition.
171
 Secondly, the question was never, during the period in focus for this thesis, 
discussed in the Conservative Party’s Parliamentary Group.172 This indicates that the matter 
was decided at the highest level.    
6.2 Unwilling to oppose: changing Norwegian role  
When it was clear that a Spanish application would definitively come, the activity in Brussels 
increased once again. This clarification came after the 29 October when the Spanish Cortes 
gave the Spanish Government authorisation to apply for membership, with 186 against 146 
votes.
173
 The Norwegian attitude towards the new initiatives indicates that Norway’s role 
within the Alliance had changed quite notably. Gone were the objections and reservations 
from the previous period, exchanged for focus on maintaining agreement and cohesion within 
NATO.    
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A few weeks after the vote in the Cortes, Secretary-General Luns wanted the member 
countries' stance on possibly inviting the Spaniards to be observers during the Council 
meetings in December. In its instructions to the Norwegian ambassador, the Government 
admitted doubt as to whether this would be appropriate. They were not willing, however, to 
oppose the suggestion, assuming that the other NATO members agreed to the invitation. 
Regarding the domestic approval of the application, the Foreign Ministry expected that this 
could be done quickly, and would be ready in time for the NATO summit in December. 
Lastly, the Norwegian stance was very flexible towards how extensive the discussions with 
Spain between the signing and ratification of the Protocol should be. Should any of the allies 
have objections to these discussions being too comprehensive, Norway would also accept a 
less comprehensive plan.
174
  
As it turned out, several countries (Germany, France, the Netherlands and Denmark) held the 
same concerns regarding the appropriateness of inviting Spain until the country was an 
official member, ensuring that the suggested invitation was not sent.
175
 The Norwegian 
reservation to voice their concerns nonetheless suggests an attitude, absent in the previous 
period, where being the one to raise objections had to be avoided. This was an attitude that 
would come to characterise the Norwegian policy during the months leading up to Spain’s 
accession to the Alliance, evidently still concerned with the image they were projecting, but 
by now wanting to create another.     
The same approach could be seen in the discussions regarding Secretary-General Luns’s 
suggestion for the first official response to the Spanish application. The Norwegian 
Government felt that the draft went a bit far in anticipating the decision of the Spanish 
Foreign Minister. It would, on the other hand, be wrong to give the impression that Norway 
received Spain's desire for membership with mixed feelings. The section about the accession 
process could perhaps be made more descriptive, so as to avoid giving the impression that the 
process was a mere formality. The instructions from the Government emphasised, however, 
the importance of the Norwegian delegation adopting a low profile, with the aim of joining 
the consensus.
176
 This instruction about keeping a low profile supports the view that Norway, 
during this period, wanted to avoid standing out, at least in the negative sense of the word, 
within the Alliance.  
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6.3 Domestic approval 
Even though it was now clear that the Norwegian Government would support Spanish 
accession to NATO, the issue still had to be cleared domestically. Before signing the protocol 
on Spanish membership, the Government would have to consult with the Parliament’s Foreign 
Relations Committee, and the ratification of the Protocol would later have to be submitted to 
Parliament.
177
 The time had come for a litmus test for how the Spanish issue had evolved in 
Norwegian politics.   
Conservative Foreign Minister Svenn Stray's statement to the Parliament's Foreign and 
Constitutional Committee regarding Spanish membership in NATO differed on certain points 
from the rhetoric of the Labour Government. After Franco's death, he argued, the 
democratisation process in Spain, and the country's desire to participate actively in the 
cooperation between the Western democracies, had changed the attitude these countries once 
had toward Spain. The reintroduction of democracy in 1975/1976 had made the Western 
countries able to accept Spain as an equal partner. Stray admitted, however, that the 
democracy in Spain still had its problems. The attempted coup in February was a reminder of 
this. NATO membership would in itself be no guarantee against attempted coups. It entailed, 
however, recognition of the Spanish democracy, and such recognition could help to 
consolidate and strengthen democracy in the country. Furthermore, Spanish NATO 
membership did not involve any change in the balance of power between East and West. Last, 
but not least he highlighted the fact that Spain's decision to seek NATO membership came 
about as a result of a democratic decision process. Norway, he argued, had no right to 
overrule this. The Government would advocate Norway’s endorsement of Spain as a member 
of the North Atlantic Alliance.
178
 
This was a view the Foreign and Constitutional Committee had no problems endorsing. When 
they later wrote their recommendation to the Parliament, the Committee expressed the view 
that Spain's participation in NATO would mean a strengthening of the Alliance as a defence 
organisation. In view of the positive development and democratisation process that had taken 
place in Spain in recent years, the Committee saw the fact that Spain now had taken steps to 
express desire for membership in the Alliance as a natural consequence of the country’s 
progress. On this basis it would also be valuable that Spain joined as a full member of the 
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defence pact, which included most countries in Western Europe. The Committee, 
unanimously, advocated that Norway should approve the Protocol on Spain’s accession.179 
The fact that the Committee unanimously agreed on this, suggests that there was broad 
agreement on the question. Traditionally, it was in the Foreign Affairs Committee that 
concerns about the new international commitments were expressed, and where many of the 
most vocal proponents of national sovereignty and the strongest scepticism towards 
incorporation into the new international organizations were found.
180
  
6.4 An affront to Spain: Norway as an active proponent of Spanish 
membership 
Norway would no longer play the role as one of the brakemen with regard to Spanish 
membership in NATO. In fact, the Norwegian Government in some situations now acted as 
one of the drivers of the process, reminding other members of earlier practice and promises 
and pointing to inconsistencies in their behaviour. This new role was evident when problems 
regarding the Spanish accession emerged in the Netherlands and in Greece, and Norway, in 
order to avoid inconsistencies between earlier commitments and current action to be exposed, 
actively promoted Spanish membership.     
At a Council meeting on 26 November, it was clear that the Netherlands could not take a final 
stand on Spanish membership and, consequently, could not approve the official statement of 
the Secretary-General. Though the Dutch ambassador was quite certain it would be positive, 
the Dutch stance would not be clear until the next meeting of the Government, which would 
take place on 1 December.  Several of the permanent representatives emphasised the fact that 
the Dutch reservation might have unfortunate consequences, especially if the delay was 
leaked to the press. Among the members to criticise the Netherlands for this reservation, was 
Norway. The Norwegian ambassador pointed out that the timeframe for consultations with the 
parliamentary bodies in the members’ capitals would now be further shortened. In particular, 
it would be unfortunate if the case had to be submitted to the Foreign Affairs Committee 
without the argument of complete agreement between the Allies.
181
 This is an example of how 
the Norwegian role within the Alliance had changed. Whenever somebody else had raised 
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objections during the previous period, either the Norwegian delegation remained silent, or 
they supported the objections. The fact that they now were among the members to reprehend 
others for deviating from the agreed procedure, seems to lend support to the argument about 
focus on cohesion within the Alliance. The role of the US, however, remained unchanged. If 
anything, the American use of strategic argumentation was more pronounced than ever.  
The US ambassador expressed strong disappointment with the Dutch attitude, which he found 
most unfortunate. Pointing to the fact that the Council had worked on the scenario for Spanish 
accession for months, he argued that this delay should have been unnecessary. If anyone had 
doubts about Spain's democratic disposition, there was hardly anything that would be able to 
play more into the hands of right-wing extremists and isolationists in Spain than this Dutch 
hesitation. Accepting Spain as a full member of the democratic Europe was a historic event, 
he added, and should not be obscured by procedural questions. In closing, he argued that it 
was unreasonable for a single Government to break the previously stated consensus in this 
matter.
182
 A few days after this meeting, on 2 December, the Spanish Government contacted 
the Secretary-General of NATO and officially expressed the desire to be invited to accede to 
the North Atlantic Treaty. The protocol was then supposed to be submitted for signature at the 
NATO summit in Brussels 10 December. After the Dutch Government confirmed their 
positive attitude
183
, everything seemed to be in place for Spain to join NATO.  
The process of entanglement, however, was not yet over. Complications emerged when 
Greece suddenly objected to the procedure regarding the NATO Council’s handling of the 
Spanish request for membership in the Alliance, which all of the members had agreed to 
follow in order to ensure a rapid enlargement process. Greece now wanted the Secretary-
General only to acknowledge that the Spanish inquiry had been received, and to inform that 
the NATO Council would discuss the inquiry.
184
 The Norwegian reaction to this move from 
Greece is perhaps the best indication of the changes in the Norwegian policy towards Spanish 
membership, and not least of how Norway now used rhetorical action to persuade other 
members to   accept the will of the majority in the Alliance.  
The first of December the Norwegian Foreign Minister summoned the Greek ambassador. 
Referring to information from Brussels about the Greek objection, he emphasised that 
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Norway regarded this as very unfortunate. Any member of the Alliance was free to express 
concerns regarding enlargement, but if Greece held such concerns they should have informed 
the other members at an earlier stage.  Greece also had every right not to ratify the Protocol of 
the Spanish accession, but it was very unfortunate that they only now raised objections to the 
agreed procedure. Regardless of any technical matter, however, the importance lay in the 
substance of the objection. The Foreign Minister asked the Greek ambassador to inform his 
government that Norway, a friend of the democratic Greece, could not understand the Greek 
position. If the Alliance followed the procedure suggested by Greece, it would be an affront to 
Spain. The Greek attitude could only be perceived as a Greek objection to Spanish 
membership, and Norway could not understand why Greece was opposed to Spanish 
membership. Norway would be prepared to participate in discussions about Greece's own 
relationship with the Alliance, but this question should not have anything to do with the 
question of Spanish membership.
185
 
This rather strong Norwegian reaction came after receiving a message from the Norwegian 
embassy in Washington. The American State Department viewed Prime Minister 
Papandreou's move with the utmost seriousness. Their assessment was that this could be seen 
as an attempt by the Greeks to exploit the situation to their own advantage. By demanding that 
consideration of Spain's accession be postponed to the Ministerial meeting, they could be 
seeking to achieve a connection between this question and their own claim to a NATO 
guarantee of the Greek Eastern flank. It was the State Department's hope that strong requests 
from the Allies to Athens would make sufficient impression on Papandreou to change his 
course.
186
 Apparently, it did work, because during the Council meeting the next day it was 
made clear that Greece would not oppose Spanish membership in NATO. They would also 
accept the agreed procedure, only with a few textual changes in the statement from the 
Secretary-General.
187
  
6.5 Ratifying the protocol: Norway takes the lead 
Thursday 4 February 1982 Spanish accession to the North Atlantic Treaty was approved in 
the Norwegian Parliament. 
188
 Even though the question was portrayed as nothing more than a 
formality and most parties now were in favour of Spanish accession, by more or less turning 
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into a debate on the purpose and democratic influence of NATO, it nonetheless caused quite a 
debate.  
The Conservative Party and the Centre Party expressed wholehearted support for Spanish 
membership, highlighting Spain’s democratic progress and NATO’s role as a defender of 
democracy. It was the primary role of NATO, they argued, to secure democracy and human 
rights in the member states of the Alliance. This argument was not well received by the 
representatives from Sosialistisk Venstreparti (the Socialist Left Party), who called the 
statement a drastic overstatement of NATO’s ability to influence authoritarian regimes. 
Claiming that the Portuguese dictatorship had in fact been supported and prolonged by NATO 
and its members, they maintained that there was nothing in the historical record to suggest 
that NATO membership was any guarantee for further democratic development. Their main 
argument for opposing Spanish membership, however, was that it was very unfortunate to 
strengthen the division between the power blocks within the international system. In the light 
of this, Spanish membership would be a poor contribution to Norwegian security and détente 
in Europe, it might even have the opposite effect.
189
           
These statements must be seen in the light of the history of the Socialist Left Party, which had 
its roots in the previously mentioned Socialist People’s Party, founded in 1961 by dissenters 
from the Labour Party.  The central political background to the formation of this party was the 
internal disputes about security policy in the Labour Party, and in particular the question of 
nuclear weapons in Norway’s and NATO’s defence.  However, for some of the members the 
opposition went much deeper than this particular issue. The basic idea for those who came to 
form the core of the new party was a fundamental and principled opposition to Norwegian 
membership in NATO and to all policies that might reinforce the divisions of the Cold 
War.
190
 This opposition has, up to the present, continued to influence the party’s foreign and 
security policy, and may explain why it was the only Norwegian party to oppose Spanish 
membership in the Alliance.
191
   
The representatives from the Labour Party were more reserved in their statements, but left no 
doubt about their support for Spanish membership. Underlining the fact that Spain’s accession 
to the Alliance did not alter the military balance in Europe, they argued that the enlargement 
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was an advantage to the Alliance as well as to Spain. It had been a tendency, one 
representative claimed, for Norway to forget countries, which had generated such a level of 
engagement during a state of emergency, as soon as things started to improve. The conclusion 
was that Norway should respect and trust Spain, also in this matter, and welcome them to 
participate in the cooperation of their choosing.
192
 The answers to why the Labour Party now 
seemed to have no reservations with regard to Spanish NATO membership may be many. A 
possible explanation is that such support now would have less serious consequences for the 
tensions within the Party. It does seem to confirm that the stalling and objections from the 
previous period stemmed less from ideological convictions against Spanish NATO 
membership, and more from a fear of bringing yet another potentially controversial issue to a 
party already wrought with simmering conflict over NATO decisions. Another explanation is 
that this support from the Labour Party, no longer in government, may have been a result of 
the fact that it now was not their party that would have to bear the responsibility in case the 
Spanish democracy collapsed.               
In the end, the resolution to accept Spanish membership in NATO was adopted with only four 
opposing votes, three from the Socialist Left Party and one from the Labour Party.
193
 Norway 
was one of the first countries to ratify the Protocol of Spanish accession, something that did 
not go unheeded in Spain. The Spanish authorities expressed profound gratitude for the rapid 
and convincing way the ratification process had been completed in Norway, and 
complemented them for being an example to be followed for the other NATO members. 
194
 
6.6 Opening the gates 
The fact that the Spanish authorities now saw Norway as a good example for the other NATO 
members tells us that the Norwegian policy had come a long way from the days of being 
“Spain’s Number One Enemy”. This chapter has shown that the change of government caused 
a change in Norway’s role within NATO, from gatekeeper to active proponent of Spanish 
membership. While there is no doubt that the Norwegian policy changed, this change was also 
consistent with the continual insistence on only accepting democratic states joining NATO. 
Now that Spain was a democracy enlargement had to be accepted, or Norway would be acting 
inconsistently and betraying the norms and values to which it was committed.      
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7.0 Norway and the Spanish accession to NATO 
The Spanish accession to NATO took place 30 May 1982 and was followed by a landslide 
victory for the PSOE in the elections in October the same year. The PSOE would remain in 
power for fourteen years and oversee the final consolidation of the Spanish democracy, the 
establishment of regional autonomy, the introduction of a wide range of crucial social reforms 
and Spain’s entry into the European Community.195 The accession to NATO has been termed 
the crux of the issue of the entry into the EC
196
, a fact that suggests that the Norwegian policy 
had implications for the wider process of Spain’s integration into the Western European 
community.  
This chapter summarises and furthers the analysis and evaluates the contribution of rhetorical 
action to the subject at hand. The main argument is that though the process was far from 
simple, the main changes in the Norwegian policy towards the Spanish accession to NATO 
were results of two elections: the first democratic elections in Spain in nearly forty years and 
the elections were the Labour Party was replaced  by the Conservative party as the ruling 
party in Norway. Although the underlying desire to protect democracy remained intact, these 
two elections allowed for a change in the Norwegian stance. The fact that such events were 
needed in order for the position to be altered, demonstrates the constraints imposed by 
rhetorical action on the governments.  
7.1 Answering the questions: the when, the how and the why 
This thesis has given an account of the Norwegian policy on the question of Spanish NATO 
membership from 1975 to 1982. Returning to the research questions posed at the beginning of 
the thesis, it is now time to assess whether they have been answered. When, how and why did 
the Norwegian stance on Spanish membership in NATO change? 
The analysis has shown that the relinquishment of Norwegian opposition would demand 
much more than the passing of a hated dictator. The Norwegian policy of demonstrative 
distancing was maintained throughout the first few years after Franco’s death, and all 
initiatives that would link Spain more closely to NATO were rejected. The policy did not 
begin to soften before the first democratic election had been celebrated in Spain, after which 
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Norway declared that they would respond positively to a Spanish request for membership. 
This softening, however, did not mean that the Norwegian policy had fundamentally changed. 
The Norwegian governments continually challenged Spain’s democratic credentials, and later 
also questioned the stability of the emerging democracy. When the objections regarding 
Spain’s democratic credentials were laid to rest in September 1981, they had already been 
substituted by concerns about the timing of a possible Spanish accession. These concerns 
regarding the timing were maintained until October 1981 – a mere two weeks after the Labour 
Party had been replaced by the Conservative party as the ruling party in Norway. My 
argument is that the Norwegian policy softened and was adjusted to the situation at hand, both 
within and outside the Alliance. But it did not really change until the Conservative 
Government had taken over.    
In answering when the Norwegian policy changed, we have in many ways already provided 
an answer to how it changed. The changes the Norwegian policy underwent during the years 
of Labour rule were in many ways superficial. It was gradually adjusted, from outspoken 
opposition, to being positive in “principle” but objecting to the form and timing of initiatives, 
to outright stalling, until the Conservative Government made a Norwegian turnaround.  
It is, however, perhaps equally important to ask how Norway was able to maintain such a 
restrictive policy in the face of increasing pressure from the US. The fact that President Nixon 
was “furious” when Norway prevented the NATO fleet from visiting Barcelona in 1973,197 
clearly illustrates that the Americans from the outset did not appreciate the Norwegian 
attitude. The decision making process in NATO is obviously very important with regards to 
answering this question, in that every member in theory has veto power. Nothing could have 
prevented the US, however, from pushing harder and making threats in order to change the 
Norwegian stance. It seems that something must have differed from the case of Italian 
membership, where Norway opposed the accession but yielded to Italian protests and 
American pressure.
198
 The international context may also have been important, as these events 
took place during a period when the Soviet Union seemed to be gaining strength.
199
 Cohesion 
within the Alliance must have been regarded as more important than ever, and the Alliance 
might seem weak if internal problems were made official. As argued in chapter four, however, 
my claim is that Norway during the first years after 1975 was able to maintain its opposition 
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to Spanish membership through the use of rhetorical action. Because Norway could justify its 
stance by referring to the norms and values of the community, it was able to assume the role 
of gatekeeper and thus enforce the status quo.     
With regard to why the Norwegian policy changed, chapter six argued that the turnabout came 
as a result of the Norwegian elections. The Labour Government, in charge for most of the 
period in focus for this thesis, was replaced by a Conservative Government. With a 
fundamentally different view on the international situation and how the threat of the Soviet 
Union should be handled, the foreign policy of the new government was founded on the 
principle of loyalty to NATO. This focus on loyalty and cohesion within the Alliance was 
clearly evident in the Norwegian policy towards the Spanish accession after the change of 
government. Another important element is that the Conservative Government did not have to 
cope with internal conflicts about their foreign and security policy. The emphasis put on 
avoiding such conflicts is evident from the Government’s so called inner vote of confidence.    
As with the previous question, it is also important to ask why the Norwegian policy did not 
change. Why did almost seven years pass between the death of Franco and the death of 
Norwegian opposition? First of all, and that also answers one of the sub questions, Norway 
held genuine concerns about the level of democracy in Spain. It is obvious that the first few 
steps towards democracy were not considered to be sufficient by the Norwegian Government, 
still clearly influenced by the emotional and political resonance of the Spanish question. 
Furthermore, these concerns about Spain’s democratic credentials lasted all the way up to 
September 1981.  The evaluation made by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the 
aftermath of 23F tell us that this was, first and foremost, out of fear that NATO might end up 
with another undemocratic country in its ranks. Mark Smith argues that one of the main 
reasons for NATO wanting Spain to join was that a young democracy joining NATO could 
lend added weight to the idea of NATO as a democratic alliance. This meant that what had 
previously been the reason for excluding Franco’s Spain from the alliance – the regime’s lack 
of democratic credentials – now became the reason for including the country.200 It seems, 
however, that this might have been one of the main reasons why Norway wanted to stall the 
process: the fear of what might happen should Spain join and later revert to an undemocratic 
regime. This would have consequences not only for the reputation of NATO as such, but also 
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for Norwegian membership in the Alliance and not least for the level of tension within the 
Labour Party and movement.   
As argued in chapter five, the main reason for the stalling and the objections regarding 
procedural matters with regard to Spanish NATO membership was tension within the Labour 
Party and Movement. The most important for any politician is, after all, to get re-elected. 
Getting re-elected is not easy when your party is simmering with conflict, and avoiding 
another potentially controversial foreign and security issue was crucial. Considerations for the 
other member states in NATO were therefore outweighed by considerations for the tensions 
within the Labour Party. Another element that might have been influential was related to 
Norway’s so called “struggle for the Northern flank”. 201 Chapter three showed that 
Norwegian politicians during the 1950s and 1960s were worried that enlarging NATO 
towards the South might lead to a lower priority to the Northern flank. Throughout the 1970s, 
however, NATO’s willingness to give priority to the defence of Norway was greatly 
improved. This meant that the outlook for Norway’s defence during the 1980s was better than 
it had been since the Cold War began
202
, and opposing the US in NATO was probably not 
seen as going at the expense of Norwegian security. Lastly, it seems as if Norway to a certain 
degree got locked in the position of spokesman for objections concerning Spanish NATO 
membership. Once such a position was taken, it was not easy to take another, both with regard 
to the opposition within the party and the other members in NATO.    
In summary, the change in the Norwegian stance may boil down to being a consequence of 
two elections: The first democratic elections in Spain in almost forty years made Norway 
relinquish active opposition to all but questions regarding procedure and timing. A few years 
later, the Norwegian change of government turned Norway into an active proponent of 
Spanish NATO membership.      
7.2 Answering the questions: consensus, pressure and context 
One of the sub-questions posed in chapter one has already been addressed, but the rest remain 
to be assessed. As for consensus across party lines in the Norwegian Parliament, chapter four 
showed that although the Conservative parties did not always agree with the Government’s 
policy, they did not directly oppose it. An explanation of this is that, while it was a source of 
conflict within the Labour movement, the foreign policy after the Norwegian accession to 
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NATO helped to curb cross-party conflicts. Usually it received broad political support, and it 
became a self-imposed task for the non-socialist parties not to challenge the Labour Party and 
its left wing in such a way that the foreign policy could go off course. In much the same way, 
the Labour Party worked for the broadest possible support for their foreign policy. The new 
alliance politics was not a party matter, but a national matter where Norway had to speak with 
one voice. In this way, NATO membership also created a close connection between foreign 
and domestic policy. The Labour Party and the non-socialist parties often curbed domestic 
political differences in the name of foreign policy.
203
 The fact that the Conservative Party 
indeed had different ideas about the Spanish accession than its predecessors became obvious 
as they came to power in 1981. An additional explanation why this differing view was not 
more visible lies in the fact that the Labour Government to a great extent kept the issue away 
from Parliament after 1976. 
Moving on to the question of external and internal pressure the analysis has shown that the 
Norwegian Government did indeed face pressure, both from the US and from the opposition 
within the Labour Movement. The internal pressures was, for the most part, of an indirect 
character and lead the Government to attempts at stalling the process of the Spanish 
accession, while the pressure from the US was direct and increasingly characterised by 
strategic argumentation.  
As the analysis has shown the international context was also important for the Norwegian 
policy. The Cold War and the Spanish transition provided the crucial backdrop, and on 
several occasions international events influenced the Norwegian stance on Spanish 
membership directly. In line with previous research, however, I argue that the domestic 
political climate was the decisive factor throughout the period in focus for this thesis.  
7.3 Norway and the Spanish accession to NATO in light of rhetorical action 
IR-theory, by design, offers only partial explanations. The same goes for the theory of 
rhetorical action and its application to this case. But this fact does not diminish the value of 
the insight this theory can provide for the process of Spain’s accession to NATO and the 
Norwegian policy on the matter.  
Schimmelfennig’s use of rhetorical action is helpful in understanding the end result of this 
round of NATO enlargement. With the transition in Spain coming to an end, the new liberal 
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identity of the country necessitated an open door policy on the part of NATO. At this point 
strategic argumentation also became an effective tool for Spain itself and its supporters within 
the organisation. With regard to the rest of the process, however, the explanatory power of 
Schimmelfennig’s approach is not the strongest. Directly applied to the empirical data, the 
theory is not able to explain Spain’s exclusion, or the Norwegian influence on this decision. 
This does not mean however, that the logic of rhetorical action is not useful in answering 
these questions. In its modified form the theory of rhetorical action sheds considerable light 
on this part of the process and, in doing so, it enables me in this thesis to make certain 
contributions to the theoretical approach.       
The contribution of this thesis to the theory of rhetorical action is threefold. Firstly, it shows 
the complexity of the middle stage of the enlargement process of international organizations. 
Between the initial preferences of each member state and the normative conformity that 
secures membership for new states, the role of the gatekeeper is essential. By turning 
Schimmelfennig’s argument around this thesis has shown how Norway used rhetorical action 
to exclude Spain from the Alliance. Through the strategic use of value-based and normative 
arguments, Norway was able to achieve an outcome different from the one that would have 
resulted from the distribution of power and interests alone. Despite the fact that the majority 
and the most powerful of NATO’s members, the US, favoured Spanish membership, Spain 
was excluded for seven years after the death of Franco.  
Secondly, this thesis has shown that the image of rational actors may be questioned. In the 
case of Spanish NATO membership Norwegian foreign policy was clearly influenced by the 
emotional resonance of the Spanish question in the Labour Movement. This created a link 
between domestic and foreign policy, and resulted in a behaviour that cannot always be 
termed rational.  
Lastly, this thesis shows that strategic argumentation is used both domestically and 
internationally, a fact that may also help explain how actors get locked in positions once they 
are taken. Once Norway had taken the role as the most outspoken opponent of Spanish 
membership, it was not easy to leave it behind. The opposition within the Labour party 
expected Norway to take the most restrictive stance, and the tension might have increased if it 
did not. The discussion about the Danish objection in chapter five clearly illustrates this point. 
Additionally, Norway got locked into this position by other members. Knowing that Norway 
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would voice their concerns, they kept silent and only afterwards agreed with the Norwegian 
position. This way they avoided potential criticism for being the ones to speak out.         
7.4 Concluding remarks 
In providing new empirical evidence about the Norwegian policy towards the Spanish 
accession to NATO, this thesis has elucidated a hitherto underresearched part of Norwegian 
foreign policy history. In doing so it might broaden our understanding of Norwegian foreign 
policy, especially in instances where the domestic and intraparty situation to a certain extent 
determines the country’s policy towards other states and in international organisations.  
The thesis has also portrayed the process of NATO enlargement from another perspective. 
The fact that Norway succeeded in keeping Spain out of the Alliance for such a long time 
provides a good example of small states occasionally being able to hinder the implementation 
of policies wanted by both the majority and the great powers within an alliance. One might 
also argue that the Norwegian policy had consequences that went beyond NATO. One of the 
main arguments of the proponents for Spanish NATO membership was that Spain’s accession 
to the organisation entailed recognition of the country as a democracy. Such recognition was 
crucial for Spanish membership in the EC, and the Norwegian opposition may thus have 
influenced the process of European integration in a wider sense. In the light of this, the 
evidence of this thesis has implications for the influence small states are able to obtain within 
international organisations.    
Finally, this thesis has illustrated that rhetorical action was a frequently used tool in this round 
of NATO enlargement. Used both to promote and to prevent the Spanish accession, strategic 
argumentation was able to influence the decision making process within the Alliance. There is 
no doubt that this was a conscious strategy. As Einar Gerhardsen
204
 commented on 
Norwegian insistence on not accepting authoritarian regimes in NATO: 
 ‘Since the foundation of NATO no people in Europe has lost its freedom’. 
We thought this was a good argument, and used it frequently.
205
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